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CONTROL CONTENT, NOT INNOVATION:
WHY HOLLYWOOD SHOULD EMBRACE PEER-
TO-PEER TECHNOLOGY DESPITE THE MGM V.
GROKSTER BATTLE
Written December 2, 2004*
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite Napster's legal defeat in 20011 and thousands of lawsuits
against individual file sharers,2 peer-to-peer ("P2P") file sharing has
continued to flourish . Estimates of the economic impact of illegal file
sharing on music album sales vary considerably. The recording industry
largely blames P2P file sharing for the drop in revenue from sales of CDs
from $13.2 billion in 2001 to $11.2 billion in 2003. 5 However, a recent
* This Comment was written prior to the decision of the United States Supreme Court
handed down on June 27, 2005. All arguments and analysis were construed with no knowledge
of how the court had ruled. A Postscript is included at the end of this Comment to breakdown the
unanimous Supreme Court decision.
1. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
2. See Katie Dean, R/AA Legal Landslide Begins, WIRED NEWS.COM, (Sept. 8, 2003) at
http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,60345,00.html.
3. See Thomas Karagiannis et al., Is P2P Dying or Just Hiding?, available at
http://www.caida.org/outreachlpapers/2004/p2p-dying/p2p-dying.pdf (concluding that "P2P
traffic volume has not dropped since 2003" and "is likely to continue to grow in the future, RIAA
behavior notwithstanding."); see also Brian Hindo, Did Big Music Really Sink the Pirates?,
BusiNEss WEEK ONLINE (Jan. 16, 2004), at http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/
jan2004/tc20040116_9177_tc024.htm (Data gathered by Big Champagne showed a 35% increase
in illegal traffic from 2002-2003. Additionally, Bay TSP noted a "steady migration from older,
virus-ridden programs like Kazaa to hipper peer-to-peer networks such as eDonkey and Bit
Torrent.").
4. Compare Stan Liebowitz, Will MP3 Downloads Annihilate the Record Industry? The
Evidence So Far (June 2003), available at http://www.utdallas.edu/-liebowit/intprop/records.pdf
(concluding that file sharing has contributed to the decline in CD sales) with Felix Oberholzer &
Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis (Mar.
2004), available at http://www.unc.edu/-cigar/papers/FileSharing-March2004.pdf (concluding
that file sharing does not reduce CD sales).
5. See David McGuire, Hollywood Sues Suspected Movie Pirates, WASHINGTONPOST.COM
(Nov. 16, 2004), at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A54423-2004Nov]6.html
("Record companies' sales have plummeted as the popularity of free 'peer-to-peer' file sharing
services like Kazaa and eDonkey has grown.").
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study suggests that P2P file sharing does not reduce album sales at all, and
may actually increase sales of popular albums.6 This claim is corroborated
by Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA") data, stating that
retail unit sales of CDs increased in 2004 for the first time since 2000.7
Even more indicative of the growth in legal music consumption is the
fact that paid downloads of digital singles, which are not included in the
RIAA totals, skyrocketed from 19.2 million tracks in the last half of 2003
to nearly 140 million in 2004.8 In January 2005, Apple's iTunes online
music store sold its 250 millionth song and was selling 1.25 million songs
per day.9 Later in 2005, the CEO of the RIAA stated, "The public's
excitement for new music formats, coupled with the music community's
enthusiasm for distributing its content in new ways, have been a real spur
to innovation for our industry."' 0
Given this tremendous growth in legal distribution of digital content,
it comes as less of a surprise that artists themselves view P2P file sharing
as more of an opportunity than a threat.11 A recent independent survey of
artists and musicians reported that the "vast majority of artists believe file
sharing poses only a minor threat or no threat at all to creative industries
like music and film.",1 2 Despite these positive reports on the state of the
music industry and the effects of P2P file sharing on content owners and
creators, the recording industry has turned primarily to the courts to stop or
deter illegal file sharing.' 3  By May 2005, the RIAA had launched over
6. See Oberholzer & Strumpf, supra note 4 (Because P2P users are able to download and
listen to songs from albums that they do not own and would not have otherwise bought, they are
more likely to sample new music, end up liking it, and then purchase the entire album.).
7. See Recording Industry Association of America, 2004 RIAA Yearend Statistics, available
at http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/pdf/2004yearEndStats.pdf (stating that manufacturers'
shipments rose 2.8% to 766.9 million units).
8. See Edna Gundersen, Music Fans Reach for the Stars, USA TODAY, Mar. 10, 2005, at
ID, available at http://www.usatoday.com/life/music/news/2005-03-09-intemet-jukeboxx.htm
(stating that 139.4 million digital singles were sold in 2004 and that "these figures are not
reflected in the overall totals").
9. Peter Cohen, iTunes Music Store Tops 250 Million Songs Sold, MACWORLD.COM (Jan.
24, 2005), at http://www.macworld.com/news/2005/01/24/itunes/index.php.
10. See Press Release, Recording Industry Association of America, RIAA Issues 2004 Year-
End Shipment Numbers (Mar. 21, 2005), available at http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter
/032105.asp.
11. See Artists, Musicians and the Internet, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, Dec. 5,
2004, at ii, available at http://www.pewintemet.org/pdfs/PIPArtists.MusiciansReport.pdf.
12. Id. at 21.
13. See Electronic Frontier Foundation, RIAA v. The People, at
http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/riaa-v-thepeople.php (last visited Apr. 2, 2005) (providing links to
court documents in hundreds of industry suits against individual "Doe" defendants).
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10,000 copyright infringement lawsuits against individual P2P users.
14
The film industry has largely escaped the P2P threat-until now.
15
Next generation P2P networks enable file sharers to swap not only music,
but also feature films and nearly any form of digital content. 16 In 2003,
former Motion Picture Association of America ("MPAA") president Jack
Valenti cited an estimate that 400,000 to 600,000 movies are illegally
downloaded daily. 17 At the end of 2004, the MPAA launched their own
legal and marketing campaign to deter illegal file sharing of copyrighted
motion pictures.' 8 Indeed, one cannot rent a movie or sit in a theater today
without being bombarded with previews branding illegal file sharing as
"Rated I: Inappropriate for All Ages."
However, the strategy of deterring individual P2P file sharers does
not provide content owners with an effective remedy to the alleged
copyright infringement that occurs through P2P networks.' 9 Therefore, the
content industries have also sued P2P network operators in hopes of
shutting them down or forcing them to remove unauthorized copyrighted
works from the networks. In these cases, the central legal issue is whether
providing P2P file sharing software renders operators secondarily liable for
the direct infringement committed by the individual users of the P2P
software. Although the courts have addressed the issue of secondary
liability in more traditional contexts with some degree of clarity, they have
14. See Frank Ahrens, Music Industry Sues Hundreds of File Sharers at Colleges,
WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 13, 2005, at El; Bill Werde, Congress vs. File-Sharing, ROLLING
STONE, Oct. 28, 2004, at 21 (After the content industry's defeat in MGM v. Grokster in August
2004, the RIAA announced it was launching another 762 lawsuits.).
15. See Chris Taylor, Invasion of the Movie Snatchers, TIME MAGAZINE, Oct. 4, 2004, at
A2 (The MPAA estimates that, "as many as a half a million movies are swapped online every
day."); see also infra Part V.A (discussing the factors that have inhibited using various business
models to legally distribute films).
16. See id.
17. See GARTNERG2 & THE BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY AT HARVARD
LAW SCHOOL, Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World, at 12 (ver. 2, Jan. 2005),
available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/media/wp2005 (citing the MPAA, at
http://www.mpaa.org/jack/2003/2003 02_24.htm).
18. See McGuire, supra note 5 (MPAA President Dan Glickman stated, "The future of our
industry, and of the hundreds of thousands ofjobs it supports, must be protected from this kind of
outright theft using all available means.").
19. See generally Mark A. Lemly & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright
Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1350-51 (2004) (explaining
that the high of cost litigation against individuals and relatively small settlements have driven the
recording industry to bring suits against the P2P network operators). Nevertheless, to the extent
that this strategy heightens public awareness of the illegal nature of P2P file sharing, increases the
stigma attached to "piracy," and induces P2P users to convert to legal distribution channels, the
lawsuits may be successful long term.
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struggled to apply these doctrines in the context of P2P networks.2
In a 1984 Supreme Court case known as "Sony-Betamax," the Court
protected VCRs and technologies that are "capable of substantial
noninfringing uses"'21 from secondary liability.22  Despite the protection
afforded to providers of such technologies under Sony-Betamax, the
content industries have largely prevailed in the courts. For instance, in
2001, in A&M Records Inc. v. Napster, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that the
Sony doctrine offered little protection to Napster, a P2P software provider
who had knowledge of its users' infringements and provided the "site and
facilities" for infringement. 3 Then, in 2003, the Seventh Circuit held in In
re Aimster that the Sony doctrine did not shield Aimster, another P2P
software provider, from liability for contributory copyright infringement
where the software's purpose and primary use was to facilitate illegal file
sharing.24
With the legality of P2P file sharing software seemingly in jeopardy,
in 2003 the Central District Court in California reached what appeared to
be the opposite conclusion in MGM v. Grokster.25 The court relied on its
decision in Napster and held that defendants Grokster and StreamCast, both
providers of P2P software, were not liable for either contributory copyright
infringement or vicarious liability. 26 The content industries appealed the
trial court's decision, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision on August 19, 2004.7 The Supreme Court agreed to review the
Ninth Circuit's MGM v. Grokster decision and heard oral arguments on
March 29, 2005.28
This Note analyzes the central legal issues raised in MGM v. Grokster
within the context of current technological and market developments.
Specifically, Part II discusses the legal doctrines of secondary liability in
copyright and examines how courts have applied them in the context of
20. See generally infra Part I.C (discussing secondary liability in copyright as applied to
P2P technology).
21. Sony Corp. of Am., Inc. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
22. Id. ("The staple article of commerce doctrine must strike a balance between a copyright
holder's legitimate demand for effective-not merely symbolic-protection of the statutory
monopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas of
commerce.").
23. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, .1022 (9th Cir. 2001).
24. See In re Aimster, 334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003).
25. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
26. Id. at 1043.
27. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1167 (9th Cir. 2004).
28. Linda Greenhouse, Lively Debate as Justices Take on File Sharing, NY TIMES, Mar. 30,
2005, at C 1.
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P2P technology. Part III analyzes the Ninth Circuit's decision in MGM v.
Grokster and articulates a multi-factor balancing test that provides a
workable compromise between the interests of copyright holders,
innovators, and consumers. Turning away from legal analysis, Part IV
assesses the social and commercial value of P2P networks. Part V surveys
the technological and market developments that are increasing the ability of
copyright holders to control their content and fueling the rapid growth of
business models designed to legally distribute digital content online.
Lastly, Part VI examines the evolving roles of the courts and Congress in
resolving copyright disputes and providing effective remedies in this digital
era.
In conclusion, this Note will argue that-given the value of P2P
networks, the current pace of technological and market developments, and
the institutional limitations of the courts to provide a fair, efficient, and
consistent standard-the Supreme Court should demonstrate restraint when
deciding whether to rewrite the law of secondary liability for copyright
infringement. Rather, the Court can further the interest of copyright
owners, innovators, and consumers by adhering to Sony, affirming the
Ninth Circuit's decision in MGM v. Grokster, and deferring to Congress to
draft appropriate legislation.
II. BACKGROUND OF RELEVANT LAW
A. Direct Copyright Infringement
Under Title 17 of the United States Code, copyright29 holders have
the exclusive rights to (1) reproduce works, (2) prepare derivative works,
(3) distribute copies of works to the public, (4) perform works publicly, (5)
display works publicly, and (6) perform works publicly by means of digital
audio transmission.3 ° Under certain circumstances, these exclusive rights
are limited.31 In order to prove a claim of direct copyright infringement, "a
plaintiff must show that he owns the copyright and that the defendant
himself violated one or more of the plaintiffs exclusive rights under the
29. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (The subject matter of copyright includes original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression. Works of authorship include the
following categories: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying
words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and
choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other
audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works.).
30. Id. § 106.
31. See generally id. §§ 107-22 (limiting and defining the scope of copyright exclusivity).
20051
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Copyright Act."32 File sharers who make copyrighted works available for
others without the permission of the copyright holder are illegally
reproducing and distributing those copyrighted works. So long as the
copyright holder can prove ownership,33 the file sharer is liable for
copyright infringement. In lawsuits against P2P software providers for
secondary copyright infringement, the issue of direct liability is rarely
contested.34
B. Secondary Copyright Infringement and the Sony Doctrine
Secondary liability is a common law doctrine, derived from tort law,
which holds a second party liable for direct infringement by others. 35 A
party may be secondarily liable under either of two theories, contributory
infringement or vicarious liability. Contributory infringement requires (1)
knowledge of a second party's infringing conduct, and (2) causation,
inducement, or material involvement with respect to the infringing
conduct. 36.  Vicarious infringement, rooted in the respondeat superior
doctrine, which holds employers liable for the illegal conduct of their
employees and agents, requires (1) the right and ability to supervise the
infringing conduct, and (2) a direct financial interest in that conduct.37
Vicarious liability, unlike contributory infringement, does not require that
the defendant be aware of the infringement.38 Courts have applied the
doctrine of vicarious liability outside the context of the employer-employee
relationship to other relationships or arrangements, such as franchise
owner-concessionaire, 39 dance hall-dance band,40 talent agency-concert
32. Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001).
33. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining a copyright owner as one who owns any one of the
exclusive rights comprised in a copyright).
34. See, e.g., MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2004)
(declaring that direct liability is undisputed and, therefore, is not an issue in the case).
35. Elizabeth Miles, In re Aimster & MGM, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.: Peer-to-Peer and the
Sony Doctrine, 19 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 21, 22 (2004).
36. See, e.g., Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162
(2d Cir. 1971) (stating that "one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes
or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a
'contributory' infringer.").
37. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963); see
also Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198-99 (1931); Dreamland Ball Room,
Inc. v. Ager, Yellen & Bomstein, Inc., 36 F.2d 354, 355 (7th Cir. 1929) (holding dance hall
proprietors liable for hiring bands that played infringing music).
38. See Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 307.
39. See id.
40. See Buck, 283 U.S. at 191.
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41 4promoter, swap meet provider-vendor.42  Traditionally, developers or
suppliers of technologies such as musical instruments, typewriters, printing
presses, and photocopy machines were not subject to secondary liability for
copyright infringement committed by users.43
This changed in the 1980s. In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc.,4 4 the Supreme Court applied secondary liability for
copyright infringement in the context of new copying technology.45
Plaintiffs Universal and Disney, which owned copyrights in many motion
picture and television shows, sued Sony for contributory copyright
infringement arising from Sony's sale of Betamax videocassette recorders
("VCRs"), which could be used to tape movies and television programs.46
Without guidance from the Copyright Act, the Supreme Court drew on
patent law's "staple article or commodity of commerce" doctrine, which
prevents patent holders from extending their exclusive patent rights to
control the sale of products that could infringe a patent but have other
legitimate uses.47 The Sony Court created a parallel exemption in copyright
law for contributory copyright infringement, stating, "The sale of copying
equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute
contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate,
unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial
noninfringing uses."
4 8
Despite evidence of widespread infringing use of Sony's VCRs, a five
to four Supreme Court majority found that VCRs were capable of "private,
noncommercial time-shifting in the home"--recording television
programming using their VCR for later home viewing. 49 Time shifting,
held to be a noninfringing "fair use" under copyright law, was sufficient to
shield Sony from contributory copyright liability.50 As such, the Court did
41. See Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1163 (holding a talent agency liable for infringement for
promoting its clients' infringing public performances).
42. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 260 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding the
proprietors of a swap meet liable for their vendors' sale of illegal recordings).
43. See Lemly & Reese, supra note 19, at 1356.
44. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
45. See id.
46. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 432 (C.D. Cal.
1979).
47. Sony, 464 U.S. at 440; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000) (articulating the staple article
or commodity of commerce doctrine).
48. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (emphasis added).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 442.
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not find Sony liable for contributory infringement.1
Significantly, the VCR's purpose and the proportion of infringing use
were not relevant to the Supreme Court's decision in Sony. The Court
stated that "in order to resolve this case we need not give precise content to
the question of how much use is commercially significant. For one
potential use of the Betamax plainly satisfies this standard, however it is
understood: private, noncommercial time-shifting in the home." 53. Having
determined that the VCR had a substantial noninfringing use, the Court
overturned the Ninth Circuit, which had held that Sony sold VCRs for the
"primary purpose" of copying protected works and that "virtually all" of
the recorded material was copyrighted. Thus, the Supreme Court rejected
the Ninth Circuit's invitation to balance infringing and noninfringing uses.
The Sony dissent sided with the Ninth Circuit and argued that the Court had
upset the traditional copyright balance and proposed that the Court look to
the technology's purpose and the proportion of noninfringing uses.
54
C. Secondary Liability Applied to P2P Technology
P2P technology is a recent technological innovation, which, courtesy
of Napster, became widely available in 1999.55 P2P technology is unique
in that it enables users to share digital content through a decentralized,
user-driven platform.56 The architecture of P2P networks allows users to
communicate through the Internet in order to conduct search requests and
execute file transfers among the users of the network. 7 Users may join a
P2P network by downloading and installing P2P software onto their
computers.58 When launched, the software automatically connects the user
to the network of P2P users, scans the user's computer for shared files, and
posts a list of the user's shared files to an index.59  Any users on the
51, Id. at 456; see Lemly & Reese, supra note 19, at 1356 ("Although the issue directly
before the Court in Sony was a claim of contributory infringement, the [majority] opinion
strongly suggested that its analysis applied to secondary liability for copyright infringement
generally and that the principles in its decision would bar using copyright's vicarious liability
doctrine.").
52. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 467,491 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
55. See Tim Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 VA. L. REv. 679, 728 (2003).
56. Miles, supra note 35, at 26.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., CNET DOWNLOAD.COM, at http://www.download.com (providing links to
"most popular" downloads, which lists many popular P2P software programs available for
immediate download) (last visited Apr. 11, 2005).
59. See Miles, supra note 35, at 26.
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network may search the index for specific files and download them to their
own computers, free of charge.
The lower courts have attempted to apply the Sony doctrine to P2P
networks. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Napster and the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Aimster suggest that the Sony doctrine does not shield
providers of P2P technology who are aware that infringement occurs on
their networks and maintain some degree of control over user activity.6 °
1. Napster
Napster began operating in 1999.6 1 Napster's file sharing technology
facilitated the transmission of MPEG-3 ("MP3") files-compressed digital.
files that are created when a user copies, or "rips," a CD onto the hard drive
of his or her computer.62 Napster's free software, "MusicShare," could be
downloaded to an individual user's computer, enabling the user to "(1)
make MP3 music files stored on individual computer hard drives available
for copying by other Napster users; (2) search for MP3 music files stored
on other users' computers; and (3) transfer exact copies of the contents of
other users' MP3 files" onto the user's own computer.63 This process of
searching and downloading digital files takes place over the Internet.
64
New users are required to register with Napster and create a user
name and password.65 The Napster software searches the user's computer
for MP3 files and posts their file names to a centralized indexing server.6 6
When a user enters the name of a song or other digital file into the Napster
search engine, Napster searches the central index, returns the Internet
address of the host user or users, a connection is established between the
requesting user and the host user, and the requesting user begins to
download the file.67 Once the download is complete, the receiving user can
copy the file to a CD, play it from a computer, or transfer it to a portable
device, such as an MP3 player.
Music and copyright owners sued Napster in the Northern District
Court of California for contributory and vicarious infringement.68 In
60. See generally Lemly & Reese, supra note 19, at 1356 (noting that "lower court decisions
have cut back the protection that the Sony doctrine offers developers of dual-use technologies").
61. See Wu, supra note 55, at 728.
62. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 1011- 12.
67. Id. at 1012.
68. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1010-11.
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response, Napster argued that the Sony doctrine shielded it from secondary
liability because its software and network were capable of substantial
noninfringing uses. 69  The district court granted plaintiffs' motion for
preliminary injunction. 0 On appeal from the district court, the Ninth
Circuit read Sony narrowly and concluded that Sony merely barred
imputing constructive knowledge of another party's infringement if the
defendant's copying technology was capable of "substantial noninfringing
uses."71  In other words, a defendant who had actual knowledge of the
users' infringements and materially contributed to them would get "limited
assistance" from Sony.72
The Ninth Circuit found that Napster had actual knowledge of the
infringements occurring on its network based on both Napster's centralized
file index73 and the notices of infringement it had received from plaintiffs.
74
This was sufficient to meet the knowledge element of contributory
copyright infringement.75  With respect to the material contribution
element, the Ninth Circuit found that Napster was an "integrated service"
which provided the "site and facilities for direct infringement., 76 As such,
Napster materially contributed to the infringement and, therefore, had a
duty to police the use of its network.77
The Ninth Circuit also found Napster liable for vicarious copyright
infringement. 78 Napster stated on its website that it retained the express
right to control access to its system. 79 Moreover, through its centralized
indexing servers, Napster had the ability to supervise and control infringing
69. See id. at 1014.
70. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
71. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020-21.
72. See id; see also Lemly & Reese, supra note 19, at 1356 (It is not clear whether Sony
itself would have passed the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the Sony doctrine, as there was
evidence in Sony that users of VCRs had accumulated video libraries. This evidence could have
been presented to Sony, which would have resulted in Sony having actual knowledge.).
73. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022 (holding that Napster had "actual knowledge [of] specific
infringing material ... available using its system" and "that it could block access to the system by
suppliers of the infringing material[s]").
74. Id. at 1021 n.6; id. at 1021 (citing Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line
Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp 1361, 1371 (N.D. Cal 1995) ("[I]n an online context,
evidence of actual knowledge of specific acts of infringement is required to hold a computer
system operator liable for contributory copyright infringement")).
75. Id. at 1021.
76. Id. at 1022 (citing Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir.
1996) (finding that swap meet proprietors had provided the site and facilities for the sale of
infringing recordings)).
77. Id. at 1023.
78. Id. at 1024.
79. Id. at 1023.
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conduct by locating infringing material on its centralized search indices and
terminating infringing users. 80  In addition, Napster received a financial
benefit from advertising revenue that it generated by drawing users to the
infringing material on the Napster network.81 More importantly, the Ninth
Circuit refused to apply the Sony doctrine as a defense to vicarious
liability.82 Rather, the court stated that the issue of vicarious liability was
not directly before the court and dismissed the Sony discussion of vicarious
liability as "outside of a technical analysis of the doctrine of vicarious
copyright infringement.
' 83
2. Aimster
Aimster operated on America Online's ("AOL") client-server
platform and used AOL's Instant Messenger service ("AOL IM") to create
a network of users.84 The AOL IM network allows Aimster users to
designate all Aimster members as "buddies," which enables Aimster users
to search for any digital files located in any Aimster user's shared folder.
Upon locating the file, the Aimster software opens an encrypted connection
between the file owner and the requester and the file is transferred between
them.85 In addition to its free P2P software, Aimster provided a feature
called "Club Aimster," which allowed users to download the most popular
songs on the network for a small monthly fee.86
As in Napster, the RIAA and multiple record companies sued Aimster
for contributory copyright infringement and vicarious liability.87 Like
Napster, Aimster argued that the Sony doctrine shielded it from liability
because the software could be used for substantial noninfringing purposes,
including transferring non-copyrighted files.88 Nevertheless, the district
80. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1024.
81. See id. at 1023.
82. See id. at 1020-24.
83. Id. at 1023; see Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435
n.17 (1984) (The Supreme Court stated, "The lines between direct infringement, contributory
infringement and vicarious liability are not clearly drawn." Thus, although the issue directly
before the Court was a claim of contributory infringement, the majority strongly suggested that
the Sony doctrine applied to vicarious liability.); see also Sony, 464 U.S. at 437 n.18 (citing and
discussing vicarious liability cases as examples of imposing liability on "the 'contributory'
infringer").
84. See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 642 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
85. Id. at 642-43.
86. Id. at 644-45 (Club Aimster members could visit the Aimster website, view the
"Aimster Top 40" list, and click on a song title to search the network and download the file.).
87. Id. at 639, 646.
88. Id. at 653.
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court rejected Aimster's argument and distinguished Aimster from Sony.
89
In Sony, the VCR was used for time shifting, a noninfringing fair-use. 90
Aimster, on the other hand, had not presented any evidence that its service
was actually used for any of the potential noninfringing uses that Aimster
had identified.9'
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
decision in Aimster, but departed significantly from the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Napster. The Aimster court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's
holding that "actual knowledge of specific infringing uses is a sufficient
condition for deeming a facilitator a contributory infringer., 92 After all,
such a rule would seemingly foreclose Sony's protection so long as a
plaintiff provided defendant with actual notice of the infringement
occurring on its network. Therefore,. although the Napster court found the
Sony doctrine to be of "limited assistance" to Napster due to Napster's
actual knowledge of infringement,93 the Aimster court applied the Sony
doctrine.
94
However, rather than determining whether Aimster's technology was
"capable of substantial noninfringing use," the court held that "some
estimate of the respective magnitudes of [noninfringing and infringing]
uses" must be made. 95 Although the Sony majority rejected such a rule, the
Seventh Circuit concluded "it is not enough... that a product or service be
physically capable, as it were, of a noninfringing use. Aimster has failed to
produce any evidence that its service has ever been used for a
noninfringing use, let alone evidence concerning the frequency of such
uses." 96 Thus, the court was unable to quantify the magnitude or frequency
of noninfringing use, which, under its interpretation of Sony, would have
enabled it to balance the proportion of infringing and noninfringing uses.
89. Id. at 653-54.
90. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
91. See In re Aimster, 334 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2003).
92. Id. (citing 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT 6.1.2 at 6:12-1 (2d ed. 2003)).
93. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001).
94. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 649.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 653.
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III. MGM V. GROKSTER
A. Factual Overview
In 2001, defendants Grokster, Ltd. and StreamCast Networks Inc.
97
entered into licensing agreements with defendant Kazaa BV 98 to use
Kazaa's proprietary P2P file sharing network called FastTrack.99 Grokster,
StreamCast, and Kazaa were each independently branded, marketed, and
distributed file sharing software, but their respective networks were
interoperable. 100 Defendants' users formed one network of FastTrack
users.10 1 When a user logs on to the FastTrack network, the FastTrack
software identifies all of the user's files available to be shared and adds
them to an index. 10 2 The indexing function is delegated to user computers
known as "supernodes," temporary storage locations for network
information which are located on users' computers. 10 3  Defendants'
software periodically updates the list of supemodes, so that users receive a
fresh list of supernodes each time they log on to the network.
104
In February 2002, StreamCast had a licensing dispute with Kazaa and,
as a result, Kazaa disconnected all StreamCast users permanently from
FastTrack.10 5  StreamCast developed and distributed its own branded
"Morpheus" P2P software based on the Gnutella open-source network
architecture. 10 6 Gnutella, unlike FastTrack, is a "pure" P2P network in that
it is completely decentralized-it relays search requests from one "peer" to
another without the use of a central index, as in Napster, or supernodes, as
in Kazaa.
0 7
97. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1080 (C.D. Cal. 2003)
(StreamCast Networks, Inc. was formerly known as MusicCity.com, Inc.).
98. Id. (Kazaa BV was formerly known as Consumer Empowerment BV.).
99. Id.
100. See id. ("As a result, users of all three software platforms... were able to exchange
files seamlessly.").
101. Id. ("When the actions were originally filed, Grokster, MusicCity and Kazaa BV each
independently branded, marketed and distributed file-sharing software. All three platforms were
powered, however, by the same 'FastTrack' networking technology.... As a result, users of all
three software platforms were connected to the same peer-to-peer 'FastTrack network,' and were
able to exchange files seamlessly.").
102. MGM Plaintiffs-Appellants' Opening Brief at 13, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,
380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-55894, No. 03-56236, and No. 03-55901).
103. See id. at 14.
104. See id. at 15.
105. See id. at 19.
106. See id. at 20.
107. See Wu, supra note 55, at 731-33 (describing Gnutella as a child of the open-source
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B. Procedural History
On October 2, 2001, the recording industry filed suit against
defendants StreamCast Networks, Inc. and Grokster, Ltd. for contributory
copyright infringement and vicarious liability arising from their provision
of P2P software. 10 8 On April 25, 2003, the district court granted plaintiffs'
motions for summary judgment with respect to the "current versions" of
their products and denied defendants' cross motion for summary judgment
on liability.'0 9 On May 23, 2003, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal from the
district court's April 25, 2003 order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)(1)."
Then, on June 18, 2003, the district court amended its prior order and
directed entry of partial final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(b). 1'1 Plaintiffs filed an amended notice of appeal on July 10,
2003, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
decision on August 19, 2004.' 12 Plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari with
the Supreme Court of the United States on October 8, 2004, which was
granted on December 10, 2004.1" The Court heard oral arguments on
March 28, 2005.114
C. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' Decision
1. Contributory Copyright Infringement
The first theory of liability addressed by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals was contributory copyright infringement. 1 5 "The three elements
required to prove a defendant liable under the theory of contributory
copyright infringement are (1) direct infringement by a primary infringer,
(2) knowledge of the infringement, and (3) material contribution to the
movement and a "radically decentralized design" that was "an intentional effort to create a
filesharing protocol that could avoid a lawsuit").
108. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1080 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
109. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1046 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
110. District Court Order Directing Entry of Partial Final Judgment at 4, MGM Studios, Inc.
v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d. 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (No. 01-08541 and No. 01-09923).
111. Id. at 111.
112. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1167 (9th Cir. 2004).
113. Id. cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (Dec. 10, 2004) (No. 04-480); see also Linda
Greenhouse, Justices Agree to Hear Case on Sharing of Music Files, NY TiMES, Dec. 11, 2004,
at B 1.
114. See Greenhouse, supra note 28.
115. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1160.
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infringement."" 6 Since the element of direct infringement was undisputed
on appeal, the court needed only to determine whether defendants had
knowledge of the infringement and materially contributed to the
infringement." 17
In determining the level of knowledge required, the court applied
Sony and first inquired as to whether the product at issue was capable of
noninfringing uses. Specifically, the court stated:
If the product at issue is not capable of substantial or
commercially significant noninfringing uses, then [the Sony
shield does not apply and] the copyright owner need only show
that the defendant had constructive knowledge of the
infringement. On the other hand, if the product at issue is
capable of substantial or commercially significant noninfringing
uses, then [the Sony shield does apply and] the copyright owner
must demonstrate that the defendant had reasonable knowledge
of specific infringing files and failed to act on that knowledge to
prevent infringement." "8
Thus, a finding of substantial or commercially significant noninfringing use
bars the court from imputing constructive knowledge on the part of
defendants and significantly raises the level of knowledge required for
liability.
To prove their networks were capable of substantial noninfringing
uses, defendants presented undisputed evidence that their P2P software was
capable of, and actually was, used to distribute movie trailers, free songs,
and public domain literary works. 19 Plaintiffs' failure to present evidence
to rebut defendants' showing led the court to conclude there are
"substantial noninfringing uses" of the software, and the uses have
"commercial viability. 1 20 As such, plaintiffs' assertion that the software
was used primarily for infringing uses was immaterial.
121
Having found substantial and commercially significant noninfringing
uses, the court addressed whether the defendants possessed the requisite
level of knowledge-that is, whether defendants had "specific knowledge
116. Id. (citing Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004)).
117. See id.
118. Id. at 1161 (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1027 (9th Cir.
2001)).
119. Id. at 1161-62 ("Indeed, the record indicates that thousands of other musical groups
have authorized free distribution of their music through the Internet.").
120. Id. at 1162.
121. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1162.
20051
398 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:383
of infringement ... and fail[ed] to act upon that information., 122 Agreeing
with the district court, the Ninth Circuit noted the "time at which such
knowledge is obtained is significant," because knowledge obtained when
"[d]efendants do nothing to facilitate, and cannot do anything to stop, the
alleged infringement" is irrelevant. 23 Therefore, the knowledge element of
contributory infringement overlaps with the material contribution element.
The court concluded defendants did not have the requisite knowledge and
admitted that "software design is of great import," distinguishing
StreamCast's "decentralized" network and Grokster's "quasi-
decentralized" network from Napster's network. 124  The fact that
defendants maintained no control over index files was dispositive. Napster,
on the other hand, had employed a centralized set of servers that
"maintained an index of available files.' 25
Regarding the last element, material contribution, the Ninth Circuit
upheld the district court's conclusion that defendants had "not materially
contribut[ed] to copyright infringement."' 26 In Napster, the Ninth Circuit
found material contribution based on the finding that Napster was an
"integrated service" which provided the "'site and facilities' for direct
infringement."'' 27 Here, the court declined to find material contribution
because defendants did not provide the "site and facilities for
infringement." 128  Moreover, although defendants communicated with
users, the court deemed these communications "too incidental to any direct
copyright infringement.' ' 129 Reconciling this conclusion with the one in
Napster, the court highlighted that defendants "are not access providers,
and they do not provide file storage and index maintenance. Rather, it is
the users of the software who, by connecting to each other over the internet,
create the network and provide the access."' 3 ° Since defendants had not
materially contributed to direct copyright infringement, the plaintiffs' claim
for contributory copyright infringement failed.
2. Vicarious Copyright Infringement
The plaintiffs' second theory of secondary liability was vicarious
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1163.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022.
128. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1163.
129. Id. at 1164.
130. Id. at 1163.
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copyright infringement. Since the elements of direct infringement and
direct financial benefit were undisputed on appeal, the court focused on
"whether defendants ha[d] the right and ability to supervise the direct
infringers" using their P2P networks.1 3' The court reiterated that "Napster
had the right and ability to supervise.., because it controlled the central
indices of files, users were required to register with Napster, and access to
the system depended on the validity of a user's registration."
132
Since StreamCast did not maintain a licensing agreement with
Morpheus users, and Grokster "ha[d] no ability to actually terminate access
to file sharing functions, absent a mandatory software upgrade," the court
determined that defendants did not have the right to supervise its users.
The court found that "none of the communication between defendants and
users provide[d] a point of access for filtering or searching for infringing
files, since infringing material and index information [did] not pass through
defendants' computers."' 133  Plaintiffs further contended that defendants
could have prevented infringement by simply shutting down their
operations.' 34 The court foreclosed this argument, stating that "[i]n the case
of StreamCast, shutting down its XML file altogether would not prevent
anyone from using the Gnutella network. In the case of Grokster, its
licensing agreement with [Kazaa] does not give it the ability to mandate
that root nodes be shut down."'' 35  As such, the court concluded that
defendants did not operate an "integrated service" that they could monitor
and control.
136
The plaintiffs further contended that defendants could alter their
software to detect infringing content and prevent it from passing through
their network. 137 Here, the court stated that plaintiffs "confuse the right and
ability to supervise with the strong duty imposed on entities that have
already been determined to be liable for vicarious copyright
infringement."' 3 8  Thus, alternative design options were not relevant to
determining whether the defendants had the right and ability to supervise
users. 1
39
131. Id. at 1164.
132. Id. at 1165 (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011-12, 1023-
24 (9th Cir. 2001)).
133. Id.
134. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1165 (9th Cir. 2004).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1165.
137. Id. at 1165-66.
138. Id. at 1166.
139. See id.
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D. Analysis and Implications
1. The Sony Doctrine in the P2P World: What's a VCR?
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Grokster raises a critical issue
regarding the interpretation and application of Sony-what level, if any, of
noninfringing use is "substantial" or "commercially significant"? This
determination is critical because meeting this standard shields a defendant's
product or service from liability for contributory copyright infringement.
In Sony, the VCR's "primary use" was private, noncommercial time-
shifting. 140 The Court found that time shifting was a noninfringing "fair
use."'14  Significantly, in Sony, there was insufficient evidence that VCR
users were accumulating video libraries, a use that would have been
infringing. 42 Thus, the proportion of infringing use was believed to be
relatively low.
However, the Supreme Court refused to consider the proportion of
infringing to noninfringing uses, and instead, focused on whether the VCR
was "merely... capable of substantial noninfringing uses.'4 43 Thus, the
Court focused on the noninfringing capabilities of the technology.
Consequently, Sony appears to shield defendants who make only a minimal
evidentiary showing of noninfringing use. The Court declined an invitation
to balance infringing and noninfringing uses.' 44 However, the fact that a
significant use of VCRs was noninfringing time shifting suggests that the
Court was, at least on the facts, aiming to preserve a balance between
copyright protection and technological innovation.
It does not appear that the same balance exists in the context of P2P
file sharing. Compared to VCRs, P2P networks present notably unique
capabilities. The decentralized, user-driven nature of P2P networks makes
it very easy for users to retrieve (download) copyrighted files and maintain
personal digital libraries. More importantly, P2P networks enable users to
make perfect copies of copyrighted works at almost zero cost and to
distribute (upload) those copyrighted works instantaneously on a global
scale. 145 Thus, regardless of whether maintaining personal digital libraries
140. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
141. Id. at 454-55.
142. See id. at 424 n.4.
143. Id. at 442.
144. See id. at 492-93 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
145. See Aaron Burnstein, et al., The Rise ofInternet Interest Group Politics, 19 BERKELEY
TECH L.J. 1, 4 (2004).
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constitutes fair-use under Sony,146 the distributive capability of P2P
networks enables a much greater degree of infringement than was possible
by means of Sony's VCRs. In short, P2P technology is qualitatively and
quantitatively different than VCR technology.
Aware of the unique threat posed by P2P technology, the Seventh
Circuit, in Aimster, read Sony as an attempt to balance copyright protection
and technological innovation. 147  There, the court stated that "some
estimate of the respective magnitudes of [noninflinging and infringing]
uses" must be made. 148 Under the Aimster test, it was not sufficient that a
technology was merely capable of noninfringing uses. Since defendants in
Aimster produced no evidence of noninfringing uses, the court could not
quantify what degree of non-infringing use would be "substantial" enough
to warrant protection under Sony. The Aimster court continued to state that
the service provider's ability "to prevent its customers from infringing is a
factor to be considered in determining whether the provider is a
contributory infringer."'
' 49
Although the Seventh Circuit indicated that P2P software providers
may have a duty to prevent the infringing activity that their software
enables, the court expressed concern for the impact such a duty could have
on the development of new online services, stating:
If a service facilitates both infringing and noninfringing uses...
and the detection and prevention of the infringing uses would be
highly burdensome, the rule... could result in the shutting
down of the service or its annexation by the copyright
owners... because the provider might find it impossible to
estimate its potential damages liability to the copyright holders
and would anyway face the risk of being enjoined.' 50
Despite this potential impact on innovation, the court elaborated on this
policing duty and placed a relatively heavy burden on innovators, stating
that "if the infringing uses are substantial... the provider of the service
must show that it would have been disproportionately costly for
[defendant] to eliminate or at least reduce substantially the infringing
146. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (implying that library building is an infringing use and,
therefore, not covered under the fair use doctrine).
147. See In re Aimster, 334 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that in Sony, "the [C]ourt
was unwilling to allow copyright holders to prevent infringement effectuated by means of a new
technology at the price of possibly denying noninfringing consumers the benefit of the
technology").
148. Id.
149. Id. at 648.
150. Id. at 648-49.
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uses."' 51  This suggests that innovators may have to consider potential
future uses of a product or service, alternative designs, the costs of such
alternatives, and whether a court would determine that such costs are
"disproportionately costly.' ' 52 As such, the Seventh Circuit's standard can
properly be seen as an attempt to strike a balance between innovation and
copyright, by shifting the burden of producing evidence to the defendant
when the proportion of infringing use is relatively high.
Unlike in Aimster, the defendants in Grokster presented considerable
evidence-albeit largely anecdotal-of noninfringing use. They contended
that they had "entered into partnerships with several groups of independent
artists, all of whom expressly authorize[d] distribution of their works via
[P2P] networks.' ' 153  For instance, defendants introduced evidence that
GigAmerica, one group representing approximately 7000 independent
artists, had its songs downloaded thousands of times per week.
54
Moreover, the defendants argued that numerous bands including Phish,
Pearl Jam, The Dave Matthews Band, and John Mayer authorized P2P
networks to share live concert recordings among fans. 55 Defendants also
introduced evidence that P2P networks are also used to distribute
authorized "shareware" and "freeware.' ' 156 Additionally, defendants noted
that P2P networks are used to distribute public domain works. 57  For
instance, Project Gutenberg has been working since 1973 to convert public
domain works into digital form so that they can be distributed over the
Internet. '58
After reviewing this evidence and the lack of evidence presented by
plaintiffs to controvert it, the district court concluded that "[p]laintiffs do
not dispute that the [d]efendants' software is being used, and could be used,
for substantial noninfringing purposes."' 159 Rather, plaintiffs presented
evidence that over 90% of the content on defendants' networks was
151. Id. at 653.
152. See Lemley & Reese, supra note 19, at 1362.
153. Appellee Grokster, Ltd.'s Brief at 17, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d
1154 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-55894 and No. 03-55901).
154. Id.
155. Appellee Streamcast Networks, Inc.'s Opening Brief at 15, MGM Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-55894, No. 03-56236, and No. 03-55901).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 16.
158. See id.; Project Gutenberg, at http://www.gutenberg.org ("Project Gutenberg is the
oldest producer of free electronic books (eBooks or etexts) on the Internet. Our collection of
more than 15,000 eBooks was produced by hundreds of volunteers. Most of the Project
Gutenberg eBooks are older literary works that are in the public domain in the United States. All
may be freely downloaded and read, and redistributed for non-commercial use.").
159. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F.Supp.2d 1029, 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
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infringing and over 70% was under copyright by the plaintiffs.' 60 The
court found this evidence to be irrelevant to defendants' showing of
substantial noninfringing use.' 6 1 In adhering to the letter of Sony, the Ninth
Circuit refused to balance noninfringing and infringing uses of the
technology and explicitly disagreed with the balancing test that the Seventh
Circuit adopted in Aimster.162 The result, it appears, is that defendants
escaped contributory liability despite the fact that up to 90% of the files
traded on the networks were infringing. Essentially, innovation trumped
copyright.
It is not clear whether the Sony Court intended to let innovation trump
copyright. In sum, Sony cited evidence that a primary use of the VCR was
noninfringing time-shifting. Thus, Sony preserved a balance between
innovation and copyright. In Aimster, there was no actual evidence of
noninfringing uses, so the court refused to let innovation trump copyright.
However, if Aimster had presented evidence of noninfringing use, the
Seventh Circuit would have applied a balancing test to the facts to
determine whether the primary use of Aimster software was noninfringing.
In Grokster, there was evidence of "substantial noninfringing uses," but the
volume of such noninfringing use clearly did not approach the level of the
technology's "primary" purpose. As such, Grokster appears to have let
innovation trump copyright by setting a very low evidentiary threshold for
protection under Sony. Nevertheless, this appears to be exactly what the
Sony majority intended to do-and what the Sony dissent wanted to
prevent.
2. Technical Design: Inability to Control or Willful Blindness?
After finding that the defendants' P2P networks were capable of
substantial noninfringing uses, the Ninth Circuit, following Napster, stated
that the plaintiffs must establish that the defendants had "specific
knowledge of infringement at a time at which they contribute[d] to the
infringement, and [ ] fail[ed] to act upon that information."'163 Under this
standard, the decentralized nature of the defendants' networks was
dispositive because the defendants, unlike Napster, did not maintain any
central servers.164  Therefore, evidence that the defendants knew of
160. MGM Plaintiffs-Appellants' Opening Brief at 8, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,
380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-55894, No. 03-56236, and No. 03-55901).
161. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2004).
162. Id. at 1162 n.9 ("Aimster is premised specifically on a fundamental disagreement with
Napster[ ]'s reading of Sony-Betamax.").
163. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1162 (alteration in the original) (citation omitted).
164. Id. at 1163.
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infringing activity (based on receiving notice of alleged infringement
occurring on the defendant's networks) was immaterial because the
technical architecture of the defendants' networks prevented them from
blocking specific acts of infringement. 65 As such, it appears that the Ninth
Circuit's narrow approach renders the knowledge element essentially
meaningless, so long as the defendant cannot stop the infringement.
Viewed in the context of Sony, this application is correct. Indeed, a
primary purpose of the Sony decision was to bar imputing knowledge to
defendants who have only general awareness of the infringement occurring
on their networks. Under the Sony doctrine, the knowledge element
becomes much stricter, requiring specific knowledge of infringement-
actual knowledge of illegal trading of specific copyrighted files. Thus,
notices of specific illegal trades obtained after users traded the files might
meet the knowledge requirement, as in Napster, but will fail the material
contribution element unless the defendant had knowledge at a time when it
was able to prevent the specific acts of infringement. Although there was
evidence that the defendants in Grokster communicated with users and
provided technical support and product upgrades, none of these interactions
enabled the defendants to control or block the specific acts of infringement.
Therefore, when a product is capable of substantial noninfringing
uses, the inquiry under contributory infringement necessarily turns to
product design to determine whether the defendant provided the "'site and
facilities' for infringement."' 166  Vicarious liability also invites a similar
inquiry into product design in order to determine whether defendants have
the "right and ability to supervise" user activity. 167 In MGM v. Grokster,
the Ninth Circuit stated that "Grokster nominally reserves the right to
terminate access, while StreamCast does not maintain a licensing
agreement with persons who download Morpheus."' 168 Nevertheless, the
court found that "even Grokster has no ability to actually terminate
access." 169 Thus, the ability to control trumped any "nominal" right that
Grokster retained in its software licensing agreement and became the
dispositive issue in determining vicarious liability. Consequently, both
contributory infringement and vicarious liability theories turned on the
question of whether the technical architecture of the defendants' software is
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1163.
167. Id. at 1164. Since the "financial benefit" element of vicarious liability is easily
satisfied by the fact that P2P networks typically receive money from advertising, the "right and
ability to supervise" element is often dispositive.
168. Id. at 1165.
169. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1165 (emphasis added).
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such that they retain the ability to monitor and control the P2P transactions.
The ease with which Grokster and StreamCast were able to avoid
liability by technical design prompts one to ask whether such willful
blindness should allow the defendants to avoid liability. 170 The Ninth
Circuit indicated that the ability to block individual infringing users would
likely suffice as a right and ability to supervise,17' but declined the
plaintiffs' invitation to fmd liability under a "separate 'blind eye' theory or
element of vicarious liability that exists independently of the traditional
elements of liability.' 72  Nevertheless, it is important to note the
differences in the defendants' software designs.'
73
It is quite evident that the defendants chose their particular designs so
as to attempt to avoid copyright liability. 74 For instance, the defendants do
not require users to register, so it is impossible to terminate infringing
users. Napster, on the other hand, had a user-registration requirement and
an express policy reserving the right to block infringers' access for any
reason.175  Additionally, since defendants merely license access to the
FastTrack network, they do not have the legal right to alter the FastTrack
source code. Moreover, the defendants' decentralized, or quasi-
decentralized networks and lack of registration requirements made
blocking the illegal exchange of copyrighted files with filtering technology
futile. Based on expert testimony at trial, the court found that there was
insufficient evidence that filtering technology could block specific
infringing files. 176  Even shutting down the defendants' networks
completely would not end illegal file sharing. However, the Ninth Circuit
indicated that shutting down operations altogether went beyond merely
170. See generally Wu, supra note 55, at 734-37 (discussing the development of the
FastTrack network architecture used by Grokster and the Gnutella architecture used by
StreamCast).
171. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1165 (citing Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259,
262-63 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the "right and ability to supervise existed where a swap meet
operator reserved the right to terminate vendors for any reason, promoted the swap meet,
controlled access by customers, patrolled the meet, and could control direct infringers through its
rules and regulations")).
172. Id. at 1166.
173. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1033 (C.D. Cal. 2003)
(Only the current versions of the defendants' P2P software, at the time of trial, were at issue in
the case.). Therefore, the fact that defendants altered their software to remove or reduce their
ability to control users prior to the commencement of litigation was not relevant.
174. See Wu, supra note 55, at 734-737.
175. A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 ("The ability to block infringers'
access to a particular environment for any reason whatsoever is evidence of the right and ability
to supervise.").
176. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1165.
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policing the network and blocking infringing users. 7' Regardless, the
Ninth Circuit reiterated that any duty to alter a product would only come
after a defendant was found liable for secondary copyright infringement. 
T
7
In short, the Grokster defendants are unable to identify and terminate
infringing users and unable to block infringing content. 179  Therefore,
despite being functionally equivalent to Napster, defendants do not
technically provide the "site and facilities" for infringement or have the
"right and ability to control" its users. Although the courts have not
formally recognized a "willful blindness" theory of secondary copyright
liability or an affirmative duty to design software to detect or prevent
copyright infringement, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Aimster has
highlighted the schizophrenia of the modem Sony doctrine and invited the
Supreme Court to balance the harm caused by a technology with the
feasibility of alternative designs.
3. Goodbye Sony, Hello Grokster: A New Standard Proposed
The confusion over Sony and the subsequent split between the Ninth
and Seventh Circuits is before the Supreme Court for resolution. If the
Supreme Court is willing to recognize that P2P networks-and their ability
to enable user-driven, decentralized distribution of digital copies of
copyrighted works on an unprecedented scale-pose a new and grave
threat to copyright, then the Court may choose to revisit Sony and impose a
balancing test similar to the one adopted by the Seventh Circuit. The Court
could reiterate that, on the facts, Sony was an attempt to strike a balance
between copyright and innovation. Under such a standard, anecdotal
evidence that a technology is capable of noninfringing uses would most
likely be insufficient. The problem lies in determining where to set the
evidentiary threshold-what proportion of non-infringing works is
"substantial."
However, the Court may prefer to articulate a new test that would
clarify how contributory infringement and vicarious liability should be
applied to new technologies. This would allow the Court to rearticulate the
balance between copyright protection and technological innovation. Any
such balancing test should apply to products and services and should
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1166 (citing A&M Records v. Napster Inc., 284 F.3d at 1098) (It was only after
Napster was found liable for contributory and vicarious copyright liability and the case was
remanded to the District Court that Napster was required to "do everything feasible to block files
from its system which contain[ed] []the copyrighted works.").
179. Id. at 1165.
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consider the following factors: (1) the foreseeable proportion of infringing
to noninfringing use at the time the product is distributed; (2) the economic
harm suffered by the copyright holder caused by the product or service; (3)
the financial benefit the product or service derives from infringing uses; (4)
the relationship between the product or service and its users; and (5) the
benefit the product or service provides to society. These five factors need
not all be present. Rather, they should be balanced under the totality of the
circumstances.
Under this balancing test, courts would not need to assess the
feasibility of adopting alternative designs, because the costs of potential
liability would be factored into design decisions. If a defendant is held
liable under this standard, then the court could issue an injunction and the
defendant could develop an alternative design that would be more likely to
avoid liability, or alternatively, determine to shut down operations
completely. This test avoids enumerating specific products or services,
such as P2P, or uses thereof, such as distribution, because the second factor
accounts for damages caused by products or services that enable
widespread distribution of copyrighted content. Moreover, any attempt to
specify technology would be futile considering the pace of technological
change and the need for a flexible, evolving standard.
This proposed balancing test provides guidance to judges and better
aligns the incentives of innovators with the rights of content owners.
Moreover, as the development of content encryption systems and digital
rights management ("DRM") systems continue to reduce the costs of
preventing infringement on P2P networks, 180 this test provides a workable
compromise without imposing an undue burden on innovators.
a. Foreseeable Proportion of Infringing to Noninfringing Use at the Time
the Product or Service Is Distributed
Under the first factor of the proposed test, proprietors would not be
held liable for unforeseeable future uses of their product or service. This
would help to mitigate any chilling effects on technological innovation that
may result from abandoning the Sony doctrine's protection of products that
are "merely capable of substantial non-infringing use." This factor would
require defendants to prove that (a) the current uses of the network are not
infringing, or (b) the current infringing uses were not foreseeable, or (c) the
current infringing uses were not foreseeable in the current proportion. As
discussed previously, the Supreme Court should not underestimate the
180. See infra Part V.B (discussing content encryption technologies).
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burden that making such a showing may place on innovators. 181 In
Grokster, plaintiffs presented evidence that nearly 90% of the files traded
on defendants' P2P networks were infringing. Additionally, the evidence
in Grokster indicates that at the time of distribution defendants knew that
their networks would be used primarily for copyright infringement. Thus,
it is unlikely that the Grokster defendants would pass muster under the first
factor.
b. Economic Harm Suffered by the Copyright Holder Caused by the
Product or Service
The second factor specifies that the content owner has the burden of
presenting evidence of actual economic damages caused by the defendant.
Thus, the defendant could either rebut the amount of damages or prove an
alternate cause of those damages. It would not be sufficient for a plaintiff
to present data on revenue losses and the proliferation of P2P file sharing
because such data does not prove that these losses were caused by the
defendant. Given new data regarding increased sales of CDs and digital
singles, 182 it is unclear whether P2P networks are causing the amount of
damage that the content industries have presumed. Additionally,
developments in DRM technology that allow content owners to control the
digital distribution of their works will greatly reduce the harm caused to
copyright holders by P2P networks. 83 Furthermore, under this factor, P2P
network operators and service providers will have a legal incentive to
cooperate with content owners seeking to implement DRM technology to
reduce copyright infringement.
c. Financial Benefit the Product or Service Derives from Infringing Uses
The third factor borrows from the doctrine of vicarious liability and
favors liability where defendant derives a financial interest from the
infringing use of its product or service.' 84 By including this factor, the
181. See supra Part III.D. 1 (citing In re Aimster, 334 F.3d 643, 648-49 (7th Cir. 2003)) ("If
a service facilitates both infringing and noninfringing uses ... and the detection and prevention of
the infringing uses would be highly burdensome, the rule... could result in the shutting down of
the service or its annexation by the copyright owners . . . because the provider might find it
impossible to estimate its potential damages liability to the copyright holders and would anyway
face the risk of being enjoined.").
182. See supra Part I (discussing RIAA data showing an increase in 2004 sales of CDs and
digital singles).
183. See infra Part V.B (discussing content encryption and recent developments in DRM
technology).
184. See supra Part II.B (discussing the elements of vicarious liability for copyright
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balancing test essentially combines the doctrine of contributory
infringement with vicarious liability and reduces the ambiguity that has
arisen regarding the distinction between the two doctrines. Since no single
factor is required, this balancing test retains the characteristics of secondary
liability, which does not require that the defendant derive a financial
benefit from infringement. In Grokster, there was no dispute that
defendants received a financial benefit from operating their P2P
networks. 185 Accordingly, this factor cuts in favor of liability where, as
here, a defendant operates its P2P network for a profit.
d. Relationship Between the Product or Service and Its Users
The fourth factor parallels the "material contribution" element of
contributory infringement and the "right and ability to supervise" element
of vicarious liability. 86  Conflating these two elements from their
respective doctrines removes the elusive distinction between providing the
"site and facilities" and having the "right and ability to supervise"
infringing conduct. However, rather than focusing solely on defendant's
technical ability to control-which allows a defendant to escape liability by
designing a technically decentralized network-this factor relaxes the
inquiry to assess any contractual or other ongoing relationship with users.
Therefore, evidence such as that presented by the plaintiffs in Grokster,
which indicated that defendants provided ongoing technical support for
users and promoted the infringing uses of the network, 187 could weigh in
favor of secondary liability.
e. The Benefit the Product or Service Provides to Society
The fifth factor serves as a catch-all which protects innovators who
have created a product that advances greater social and economic public
policies, such as preserving the public domain, promoting freedom of
expression, or fostering innovation.'88 Therefore, although a product or
service may fail under the first factor when the foreseeable proportion of
infringing to noninfringing uses is high, the fifth factor may cut in favor of
the defendant if the noninfringing uses substantially further these public
infringement).
185. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1164 (9th Cir. 2004).
186. See supra Part II.B (discussing the background of secondary copyright infringement).
187. See supra Part III.D.2 (discussing the evidence presented by plaintiffs regarding the
relationship defendants maintained with users and the courts, finding that, despite such evidence,
defendants did not have the ability to block or control the specific acts of infringement).
188. See infra Part IV (discussing the social value of P2P technology).
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policy goals. This fifth factor, unlike the previous four, looks outside the
defendant's conduct and its effects on the plaintiff to protect the interests of
consumers and society. Hence, in Grokster, the anecdotal evidence that
was presented regarding the non-infringing uses of defendants' networks
would be assessed in light of the networks' contribution to the public
domain, freedom of expression, and innovation.
IV. THE VALUE OF P2P TECHNOLOGY
P2P file sharing is not just downloading music and movies for free.
P2P has tremendous social value. Neil Netanel put it quite clearly when he
described P2P file sharing as:
a vehicle for finding works that are otherwise not available,
discovering new genres, making personalized compilations, and
posting creative remixes, sequels, and modifications of popular
works. By engaging in such activities, people who might
previously have been passive consumers now assert a more
active, self-defining role in the enjoyment, use, and creation of
cultural expression. They also share their interests, creativity,
and active enjoyment with others.'
8 9
According to Lawrence Lessig, this is "the art through which free culture is
built."'190 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has realized the social value of P2P
networks, stating, "The technology has numerous other uses, significantly
reducing the distribution costs of public domain and permissively shared
art and speech, as well as reducing the centralized control of that
distribution."' 91
In addition to its social value, P2P technology has significant
commercial value. The true potential of P2P is in its increased efficiency
as compared to traditional means of distribution-put simply, P2P
dramatically reduces transaction costs.' 92 P2P's decentralized user-driven
nature pushes costs to the users of the system and does not require any
investment in centralized servers. 193 Furthermore, P2P networks enable
independent artists and entrepreneurs who could not previously afford to
189. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-
Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 (2003).
190. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD 9 (2001).
191. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1164(9th Cir. 2004).
192. See Lemly & Reese, supra note 19, at 1382-83.
193. Appellee Grokster, Ltd.'s Brief at 18-19, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380
F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-55894 and No. 03-55901).
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reach global audiences the ability to do so at practically zero cost. For
instance, when AOL Time Warner's Reprise Records refused to release the
album YANKEE HOTEL FOXTROT by the band Wilco, the band turned to
P2P and distributed its album free of charge. 194 Wilco received so much
interest that various labels bid on the album's release. Soon after, Wilco
signed with Nonesuch Records, another AOL Time Warner label, and the
album went gold on May 20, 2003.9'
Individual artists may offer songs for distribution via Grokster using
the increasingly popular Creative Commons licenses.1 96  These licenses
allow artists to distribute their works while retaining some, but not all,
copyrights. 197 StreamCast has already modified its Morpheus software so
that users can search for MP3 files bearing a Creative Commons license.
98
Additionally, commercial ventures including Microsoft, Altnet, Trymedia,
and GigAmerica are taking advantage of P2P technology to reach
enormous audiences at a very low cost. 199
The strongest testament to the value of P2P technology is the fact that
Hollywood is beginning to embrace P2P technology. Industry executives
have realized that they must embrace P2P as a valuable component of their
marketing and distribution strategy. For instance, the head of new media at
Maverick Records, an AOL Time Warner label, confessed that "P2P is a
likely distribution channel for our wares" and stated, "If we're going to be
intelligent businesspeople, it behooves us to understand it.''2°°  P2P
networks provide Hollywood with more meaningful data and a new
distribution channel to reach new customers. By looking at P2P download
data provided by firms such as BigChampagne, album promoters, radio
stations, and retailers can efficiently respond to consumer demand and
adjust the resources that are devoted to particular artists, albums, and
194. Id. at 19-20.
195. Id. at 20.
196. See Creative Commons, at http://creativecommons.org ("Creative Commons offers a
flexible range of protections and freedoms for authors and artists. We have built upon the 'all
rights reserved' of traditional copyright to create a voluntary 'some rights reserved' copyright.
We're a nonprofit. All of our tools are free.").
197. See Creative Commons, License, at http://creativecommons.org/license/ (providing
authors the option of allowing use for non-commercial purposes and the option of specifying
whether they wish to allow modifications, sampling, etc.).
198. Jon Healy, Musicians to Place Songs on File Sharing Network, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30,
2004, at C 1.
199. Appellee Grokster, Ltd.'s Brief at 20-21, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380
F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-55894 and No. 03-55901).
200. Jeff Howe, BigChampagne Is Watching You, WIRED, Oct. 2003, available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.10/fileshare.html.
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songs. 0 1 In short, P2P networks are the equivalent of "the world's biggest
focus group." 202
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that Lava/Atlantic Records, a
division of plaintiff Atlantic, has distributed free songs from its artists'
current albums via Grokster.2 °3 Additionally, plaintiffs Sony BMG,
Universal Music Group, and Warner Music Group announced a deal in
November 2004 with Wurld Media to provide music for its P2P service
called Peer Impact. °4 Universal has also signed a deal with Napster
founder Shawn Fanning's new business venture, Snocap, whose advanced
filtering technology will enable Universal to distribute its entire catalog of
music through P2P networks.20 5 Indeed, even Hollywood is realizing the
value of P2P technology.
V. LEGAL DISTRIBUTION OF DIGITAL CONTENT
A. Business Models
While the content industries have been busy litigating against P2P
networks and their users, there has been a dramatic increase in competition
amongst legal for-pay business models.20 6 Apple stampeded its way into
the online music distribution business in April 2003 with its iTunes music
store, which sold more than three million songs a la carte at ninety-nine
cents each in its first month in business.20 7 By January 2005, iTunes had
sold 250 million songs and was selling 1.25 million songs per day.
208
iTunes' phenomenal success has since attracted numerous rivals into the
marketplace. In 2004, software giant Microsoft and retail behemoth Wal-
201. See id. ("They'll call these stations and say, 'You need to bang this shit. You're barely
playing it, and it's already in the top 15 among alt-rock downloaders in your market. You need to
step on this at least 20 more times a week, and not while people are sleeping."').
202. Id.
203. Appellee Grokster, Ltd.'s Brief at 20-21, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380
F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-55894 and No. 03-55901).
204. Katie Dean, P2P Tilts Towards Legitimacy, WIRED NEWS.COM (Nov. 24, 2004), at
http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,65836,00.html.
205. See infra Part V.B (discussion content encryption and digital rights management
technologies, including digital fingerprinting); Brian Garrity & Carolyn Horowitz, Universal in
Deal with Napster Founder, BILLBOARD.COM (Nov. 12, 2004), at
http://www.billboard.com/bb/daily/article-display.jsp?vnu-contentid= 1000718557.
206. See generally GARTNERG2, supra note 17, at 18 (describing the growth and evolution
of online content distribution business models).
207. Laurianne McLaughlin, Music Downloads: Is It Time to Pay?, PCWORLD, June 5,
2003, available at http://www.pcworld.com/resource/article/0,aid, 1 1040,00.asp.
208. Cohen, supra note 9.
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Mart opened online music stores selling single downloads for ninety-nine
cents and eighty-eight cents respectively.
209
In addition to these a la carte business models, many subscription
services have emerged that allow temporary, or "streaming," access to
digital libraries of copyrighted music. For instance, Napster has reentered
the market as a subscription service providing instant access to over one
million songs. 210 Additionally, Sony has created a similar model, dubbed
Connect, which serves as a one-stop portal for music fans. 21' In 2004,
Yahoo spent $160 million to buy MusicMatch,212 whose free Jukebox
software enables user to organize their music and purchase single songs.
213
MusicMatch also offers a premium On Demand service, which allows users
214to instantly stream over 800,000 songs.
Until recently, competition in the market for online digital film
distribution had been considerably slow. 215 Many factors are responsible
for the anemic growth of this market. The large size of movie files and
limited bandwidth have been key limitations, because full-length films
often take hours to download. Moreover, legitimate for-pay models face
competition from illegal models, such as Film88, operating anonymously in
foreign countries with more lenient copyright laws.216 Furthermore, stiff
competition between Netflix and Blockbuster has driven the cost of DVD-
by-mail subscription rental services to as low as $15 per month.217 By the
209. See Steven Levy, Forecast: Song Costs May Fall Like Rain, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 27,
2004, at 13; see, e.g., Walmart.com, Music, at http://musicdownloads.walmart.com (last visited
Apr. 2, 2005) (selling single track downloads for eighty-eight cents each; MSN Music, at
http://music.msn.com (last visited Apr. 2, 2005) (selling single track downloads for ninety-nine
cents each).
210. See Napster, at http://napster.com.
211. See Connect, at http://connect.com.
212. Levy, supra note 209, at 13.
213. See MusicMatch, at http://musicmatch.com (last visited Apr. 2, 2005) (offering
premium version for one-time fee of $19.99, which allows users to create custom CDs from MP3
files, create custom CD labels, get personal slideshows, and more).
214. See id.
215. See generally Stefanie Olsen, Net Movies: Ready for Prime Time?, CNET NEWS.COM
(Nov. 4, 2002), at http://news.com.com/Net+movies+Ready+for+prime+time/2100-1023_3-
964285.html? ("The major Hollywood movie studios are finally getting serious about delivering
movies over the Internet.").
216. See, e.g., Stefanie Olsen, Hollywood Faces Recurring Net Nightmare, CNET
NEWS.COM (June 5, 2002), at http://news.com.com/Hollywood+faces+recurring+Net+nightmare
/2100-1023_3-932743.html (Film88, operating out of Iran, runs on a video-store model, which
lets people download or "rent" movies for three days in return for a payment of $1 to $1.50.).
217. Verne Kopytoff, Nefflix in for Blockbuster Battle Competition Heats up for Online
Company that Rents DVDs, S.F. CHRON., Jan 31, 2005, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2005/01/3 1/BUG46B1QLD 1.DTL&type=business.
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end of 2004, Netflix had acquired 2.6 million customers.218 As with the
online music market, Wal-Mart has entered the DVD-by-mail business.
Amazon.corn launched a pilot business in Britain in December 2004 and is
rumored to be planning for a U.S. launch.2 19 Although these businesses are
currently limited to sending DVDs by mail, advances in compression and
encryption technology coupled with increasing Internet bandwidth will
soon enable these companies to add online video distribution services.220
Despite the current limitations on online digital video distribution and
stiff competition from DVD-by-mail businesses, online distribution
business models have emerged.22' MovieLink, which is backed by the
major studios, including MGM, Paramount Pictures, Sony Pictures
Entertainment, Universal Studios, and Warner Bros., provides streaming
feature film "rentals" for as low as $1.99 for a single viewing.222 Another
competitor, CinemaNow, is backed by Microsoft and offers downloadable
rentals of over 1500 films for around $3 each.223 Additionally, Starz Ticket
on RealNetworks launched a third alternative in June 2004, which allows
users to download up to three movies onto their PCs for unlimited time.224
More recently, Napster has indicated that it may enter the competition for
online films.
225
In short, these business models, like P2P networks, provide instant
downloads of individual songs and movies. However, unlike P2P
networks, these online stores offer consistently high-quality digital content
without the threat of being labeled "pirates"-or worse, "felons." The
proliferation of online digital music and movie stores exemplifies the fact
that P2P networks are not bringing about the demise of the content
industries. In fact, quite the opposite may be occurring. P2P popularity
appears to have jump-started the market for legal digital content by creating
global demand for digital music and other content. Thus, to the extent that
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See GartnerG2, supra note 17, at 10-12.
222. See MovieLink, at http://www.movielink.com; see also Press Release, Department of
Justice (June 3, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/pressreleases/2004
/203932.htm (announcing that the DOJ had dropped its antitrust charges against MovieLink).
223. Stefanie Olsen, Microsoft, Cinema Now Expand Net Movie Alliance, CNET
NEWS.COM (Jan. 6, 2005), at http://news.com.com/Microsoft/o2C+CinemaNow+expand
+Net+movie+alliance/2100-1025_3-5515995.hml.
224. Jefferson Graham, Click for a Flick from Starz, RealNetworks, USA TODAY, June 14,
2004, at 3B, available at http://www.usatoday.con/tech/webguide/intenetlife/2004-06-13-
downloadsx.htm.
225. Jo Best, Napster Eyes Movie Downloads, CNET NEWS.COM (Jan. 24, 2005), at
http://news.com.com/Napster+eyes+movie+downloads/2100- 1027_3-5548022.html.
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consumers continue to find value, and perhaps protection from lawsuits, in
for-pay business models, fierce competition will continue amongst these
legal alternatives to P2P networks.
B. Content Encryption
Legal online distribution of copyrighted digital content is premised on
advanced encryption technologies, often referred to as DRM. 226 Since the
development of the compressed MP3 file format and subsequent rise in P2P
file sharing, the music industry has struggled to develop an encryption
system that would prevent or deter music piracy.227 The movie industry, on
the other hand, adopted the Content Scrambling System ("CSS") standard
for DVD encryption which prevents unauthorized duplication of DVDs.
228
Additionally, the movie industry successfully lobbied Congress to pass the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 ("DMCA"), which makes it
illegal to reverse engineer or circumvent encryption technology such as the
229CSS or other DRM systems.
Ironically, CSS encrypted files can be decrypted fairly easily.23°
Decrypted movies are increasingly available on P2P networks. However,
the large file size of movies and limited bandwidth of users' Internet
connections has limited the illegal downloading of movies. 231
Nevertheless, as bandwidth increases and storage costs continue to fall,
illegal P2P file sharing of decrypted movies is likely to increase.232
Consequently, it will be increasingly necessary for the film industry to
develop and successfully employ DRM systems.
Technically, DRM systems consist of "secure packaging and delivery
software designed to prevent purchasers and third parties from making
226. See generally Lionel S. Sobel, DRM as an Enabler of Business Models: ISP's as
Digital Rights Retailers, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667 (2003) (describing various copyright
protection models premised on DRM technology).
227. See Christopher Jones, SDMI: Divide or Conquer?, WIRED NEWS.COM (Nov. 18,
1999), at http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,32513,00.html (discussing the Secure
Digital Music Initiative's struggle to create a system for protecting and controlling digital content
that matches MP3's ease of use).
228. See Andy Patrizio, DVD Piracy: It Can Be Done, WIRED NEWS.COM (Nov. 1, 1999),
at http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0, 1282,32249,00.html.
229. See Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in sections of Titles 5, 17, 28,
and 35 of United States Code).
230. See Patrizio, supra note 228 (describing the illegal DeCSS program that enabled the
decryption of DVDs).
231. See Taylor, supra note 15.
232. See, e.g., BURNWORLD.COM, DVD Burning Hardware Review, at
http://www.bumworld.com/dvd-burner/index.htm (listing comparison information for multiple
DVD burners and links for purchase) (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
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unauthorized uses of digital works. 233 Practically, DRM systems have the
ability to prevent users from duplicating or transferring digital content.2 34
Content owners employing DRM technology could limit the number of
times users can view or listen to a file, or could fix the number of copies
permitted. For example, songs purchased from Apple are encoded with
Apple's proprietary FairPlay DRM technology and can be burned to CDs,
transferred to iPod MP3 players, or copied onto three different
computers.2 5 Adobe's eBook reader allows publishers to determine how
many times a reader may copy, print, or read aloud an eBook.236 Most
importantly, DRM technology enables copyright holders to control their
content after initial distribution.
Developments in encryption technology will continue to enable legal
online business models and protect copyrights. For example, advanced
"watermarking" and "fingerprinting" DRM technologies allows content
owners to monitor and control how their content passes through P2P
networks.2 37 Digital watermarks are essentially identification tags built into
digital files when they are created that can be tracked by computers when
users play the files.238 Digital fingerprinting works by applying an
algorithm to selected features of the content, which then converts the
content into a unique digital identification mark.239 Napster founder Shawn
Fanning's new business venture, Snocap, Inc., has developed audio
fingerprint filtering technology that will allow content owners to register,
identify, and track music files as they make their way from user to user on
P2P networks.24 ° Most importantly, fingerprinting and watermarking
enable copyright owners to specify the terms of use and sale of their
content, such as pricing and the number of times a file or song can be
viewed or played for free.24 1
233. Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management
Systems, 15 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 41, 48 (2001).
234. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 147-54 (2004) (describing how Adobe's
DRM for e-books restricts the uses of the content).
235. See John Borland, Apple's Music: Evolution, Not Revolution, CNET NEWS.COM (Apr.
29, 2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-1027-998675.html.
236. See LESSIG, supra note 234 at 148-154.
237. See Sobel, supra note 226 at 681.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. See Katie Dean, Napster Star Changes His Tune, WIRED NEWS.COM (Dec. 3, 2004),
at http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0, 1412,65893,00.html?.
241. See id.
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C. The Benefits (and Costs) of Control
P2P has evolved from a centralized "free-content, controlled-
network" model (e.g., Napster) to a decentralized "free-content, free-
network" model (e.g., Gnutella). As DRM systems are enabling content
owners to control their digital works after initial distribution, P2P is
moving towards a "controlled-content, free-network" model. Advanced
DRM technologies will continue to reduce content owners' need to regulate
P2P networks themselves. In other words, control is shifting from the
network to the content itself.
Consequently, rather than suing the P2P networks, the content
industries should distribute DRM-protected content directly to consumers
through P2P networks. This mitigates their two primary problems: (1)
losses due to illegal P2P file sharing and (2) lack of their own viable online
business models. By distributing through P2P networks, the content
industries can begin to earn their piece of the lucrative online market for
digital content. Indeed, behind the scenes of the MGM v. Grokster battle,
content industry executives are inking deals with companies, such as
Snocap, which enable controlled copyrighted content to be distributed
through P2P networks. 242
It is important to note that advanced DRM technologies have the
potential to control digital content beyond the protections afforded by
copyright law itself.243 Specifically, DRM systems have the potential to
eliminate the fair use of digital content244 and infringe on individual
privacy.245 After all, the market has every incentive to control content
exclusively, completely and indefinitely. As previously discussed, the
explosion in popularity of online music and film has attracted huge inflows
of capital and corporate interest into the online marketplace for digital
content distribution. These interests, whether aligned with the best
interests of creators and artists or not, will continue to develop technologies
242. See infra Part IV (describing record labels' acknowledgement of the value of P2P
networks and partnerships with P2P-based businesses); see also Garrity & Horowitz, supra note
205.
243. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 136 (1999) ("When
the software protects in a particular way without relying in the end on the state, where can we
challenge the nature of the protection? Where can we demand balance when the code takes it
away?").
244. See generally LESSIG, supra note 234 (discussing the ability of new DRM technologies
to provide control over digital content beyond that offered by fair-use law).
245. See Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575, 617 (2003)
(arguing that the law must provide remedies for intellectual privacy violations and that
intellectual privacy must also be built into DRM code).
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that provide content owners greater control over their digital content.
Traditionally, these corporate interests have been opposed to decentralized
networks. Understandably, they prefer to operate gated digital
communities where they can be the gatekeepers and control the distribution
and use of their copyrighted content.
In short, the new corporate business models embody a "complete
control" model--content and distribution networks are controlled. Given
the recent advances in DRM technology, controlling networks are no
longer necessary to control content. Therefore, as the market continues to
shift from a free market to a controlled market, allowing P2P networks to
survive as a quasi-public commons, despite their infringing uses, may be a
workable compromise.
VI. THE COURTS OR CONGRESS: WHO SHOULD DECIDE?
A. The Courts Defer to Congress on P2P
In its Sony decision in 1984, the Supreme Court emphasized its
reluctance to enter the realm of technology policy without Congressional
approval. The Court stated, "Sound policy, as well as history, supports our
consistent deference to Congress when major technological innovations
alter the market for copyrighted materials. 246  The Court also
acknowledged that creating liability for the makers of new technologies
that have lawful uses threatened to "block the wheels of commerce. 247
Thus, the Court protected makers of products that were "merely capable of
substantial noninfringing uses," sending a clear message to the courts that
they must be cautious not to extend copyrights so far as to deter innovation.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court deferred to Congress, which has
Constitutional authority to balance copyright holders' rights with the policy
goal of promoting innovation, so as "to promote the progress of science and
the useful arts."248 The Court elaborated, "When, as here, the Constitution
is permissive, the sign of how far Congress has chosen to go can come only
from Congress. 249
In 2004, the Ninth Circuit faced quite a predicament with MGM v.
Grokster. After all, in 1981 the content industries persuaded the Ninth
Circuit that adopting a balancing test would better protect copyrights.
246. Sony Corp. ofAm. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
247. Id. at 441.
248. Id. at 456 (citing Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530 (1972)).
249. Id.
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However, the Supreme Court in the Sony decision overruled the Ninth
Circuit. Twenty years later, the Ninth Circuit was faced with essentially
the same balancing invitation. It prudently declined. Although the Ninth
Circuit's Grokster decision mirrored Sony by overtly deferring to Congress,
its decision may be seen as one of deference to the Supreme Court.
However, taking the Ninth Circuit's Grokster decision at face value,
the court indicated that it was not the place of the courts to extend
secondary liability for copyright infringement by balancing infringing and
noninfringing uses. This time, the Ninth Circuit went out of its way to
chastise the content industry for attempting once again to preserve their
market position in the face of threatening new technology, stating:
[W]e live in a quicksilver technological environment with courts
ill-suited to fix the flow of internet innovation. The introduction
of new technology is always disruptive to old markets, and
particularly to those copyright owners whose works are sold
through well-established distribution mechanisms. Yet, history
has shown that time and market forces often provide equilibrium
in balancing interests, whether the new technology be a player
piano, a copier, a tape recorder, a video recorder, a personal
computer, a karaoke machine, or an MP3 player. Thus, it is
prudent for courts to exercise caution before restructuring
liability theories for the purpose of addressing specific market
abuses, despite their apparent present magnitude.25 °
Surely, adopting a balancing test might have served the more immediate
interests of content owners, but its long term potential to reduce the value
of P2P networks and chill technology development led the court to defer to
Congress.
B. Congress Considers the Solution
Congress has amended the Copyright Act multiple times to address
new technologies and the threats that they pose to copyrighted works. For
instance, Congress amended the Copyright Act to address digital audio
recorders,251 satellite television broadcasting,25 2 webcasting,25 3 and analog
video cassette recorders.254 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
250. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).
251. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-10 (2000).
252. See id. § 119.
253. See id. §1 14(f)(5)(A) (Supp. 2004).
254. See id. § 1201(k).
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("DMCA") of 1998 made it a crime to circumvent the technological
measures that control access to copyrighted works, 255 or to manufacture and
distribute any technology or tool designed to circumvent encryption
technology. 256  Most importantly, Congress enacted numerous narrow
exemptions from liability under the DMCA to ensure that the courts were
clear on when to impose liability on service providers.257 Recently,
Congress has enacted a host of bills regarding piracy and the need for
copyright holders to control the distribution of their intellectual property.
258
Congress has a variety of policy levers to create effective remedies
for these complex copyright problems. For instance, Congress has
employed compulsory licensing,259  imposed limited technology
26 261mandates,260 and modified copyright's remedial scheme. Moreover,
Congress may determine to let the market function without intervention.
In 2004, Congress considered a bill, known as the Induce Act, that
stood at the center of the file sharing debate.262 The Induce Act was aimed
at the providers of P2P file sharing software, such as Grokster and
StreamCast. A draft of the bill would have held anyone liable who
"intentionally aids, abets, induces or procures" copyright infringement.263
Opponents of the Induce Act argued that such language was overly broad
and likely to chill technological innovation.264 After much opposition, the
Induce Act stalled in Congress when powerful interest groups and
255. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 103(a), 112 Stat. 2860,
2863, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-05 (1998).
256. See id.
257. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000).
258. See, e.g., Protecting Intellectual Rights Against Theft and Expropriation Act of 2004
("PIRATE"), S. Res. 2237, 108th Cong. § 1 (2004); Artists' Rights and Theft Prevention Act of
2004 ("ART"), S. Res. 3021, 108th Cong. § 101 (2004); Piracy Deterrence and Education Act of
2004, H.R. Con. Res. 4077 (2004).
259. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 11 (c) (cable TV), 114 (sound recordings), 119 (satellite television
broadcasting).
260. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(k) (analog VCRs).
261. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 512 (safe harbors for online service providers), 506(a)(2) (criminal
liability imposed on noncommercial infringers).
262. Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004, S. Res. 2560, 108th Cong. § 1
(2004) [hereinafter Induce Act); see also Tom Zeller Jr., Senate Bill Aims at Makers of File-
Sharing Software, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2004, at C7 ("[Induce Act] was introduced by Senator
Orrin G. Hatch, Republican of Utah, and [was] supported by a bipartisan coalition of 10 senators,
including Democrats like Patrick J. Leahy of Vermont, Hillary Rodham Clinton of New York and
Barbara Boxer of California, as well as Republicans like Bill Frist of Tennessee and Lindsey 0.
Graham of South Carolina.").
263. Induce Act, S. Res. 2560, 108th Cong. § 2 (2004).
264. See Zeller, supra note 262.
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legislators were unable to compromise on a draft of the bill.265
In addition to the Induce Act, alternative solutions have been
developed that aim to balance the competing interests at stake. For
instance, Congress could impose a compulsory collective licensing scheme,
such as the models proposed by Neil Netane1
266 and William Fisher,267
which would retain the value of P2P while paying revenues to copyright
holders. Under Fisher's model, the creator of a recording would register it
with the U.S. Copyright Office and would receive, in return, a unique file
name, which would be used to track Internet transmissions of the work.268
The government would tax devices and services used to gain access to
digital entertainment. 269 The Electronic Frontier Foundation has endorsed
such an "industry-led collective licensing solution that would ensure
compensation for copyright owners while minimizing the need for
governmental intrusion into the digital music marketplace. 27 °
VII. CONCLUSION
Under MGM v. Grokster, a defendant can seemingly avoid secondary
liability for copyright infringement so long as its P2P software is capable of
substantially or commercially significant noninfringing uses and is unable
to actively police its network to detect and prevent direct infringement.
Both elements are easy to satisfy given the noninfringing uses of P2P
networks and the ease with which software developers can design P2P
software to avoid any ability to control user activity. Nevertheless, the
Ninth Circuit's decision prudently applied Sony and declined to adopt the
Seventh Circuit's balancing standard. The Sony doctrine, as applied in
MGM v. Grokster, provides a bright-line test that guides lower courts and
appropriately restricts judicial regulation of emerging technologies.
The conflict between emerging technologies and incumbent interests
is as old as innovation itself. While the content industries are in court suing
individual users and providers of P2P networks, the market is responding
265. See Jeff Howe, Keep Your Laws off My Technology, WIRED, Oct. 2004, available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.10/start.html?pg-5 (commenting on how the Business
Software Alliance withdrew its support for the bill because of internal disagreement over
language within the bill).
266. See Netanel, supra note 189 at 3 1.
267. See WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE
FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 199-258 (2004).
268. See id.
269. See id.
270. Letter from Shari Steele, Executive Director, Electronic Frontier Foundation, to U.S.
Senators, available at http://www.eff.org/IP/eff induceletter.php.
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with more entrepreneurial and efficient solutions that are enabling the legal
distribution of digital content and preserving the value of P2P networks.
The dramatic pace of innovation in content encryption technologies and
business models proclaims the soundness of Sony and Grokster. Thus, the
Supreme Court need not radically revise Sony, because the balance between
copyright and innovation will be struck in the marketplace, and if
necessary, in Congress.
VIII. POSTSCRIPT
Added July 20, 2005
On June 27, 2005, in a unanimous 9-0 decision, the Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit and ruled that defendants Grokster and
StreamCast could be liable for inducing copyright infringement.27' While
Hollywood executives and content owners celebrate their apparent
272victory, technologists and venture capitalists bemoan the inevitable
chilling effects the decision will have on innovation. However, a closer
reading of the Court's decision reveals an ambitious attempt to strike the
elusive balance between copyright and innovation, a balance that may
prove to serve the long-term interests of both.
A. The Supreme Court Decision
1. The Majority
The unanimous Supreme Court majority shows an adept
understanding of peer-to-peer technology and the competing interests of
copyright and innovation. The Court overtly endeavors to realign the
"balance between the respective values of supporting creative pursuits
through copyright protection and promoting innovation in new
communications technologies by limiting the incidence of liability for
copyright infringement., 274 To that end, and in light of the volume of
infringement occurring via defendants' networks, the Court finds that "the
271. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) [we have
not spelled out MGM yet, so lets not start here].
272. See William Triplett, Grokster Tuned Out: High Court Puts Unanimous Kibosh On
File Sharing, DAILY VARIETY, June 28, 2005 at 1.
273. See Heather Green, Coming to Grips With Grokster: Now the Only Thing Innovators
Are Sure of Is That They'll Have to Watch Their Step, BUS. WK., July 11, 2005, at 37.
274. MGM Studios Inc., 125 S. Ct. at 2775.
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argument for imposing indirect liability in this case is, however, a powerful
one." 275
To establish the legal standard for secondary liability, the Court turns
to its 1984 Sony 27 6 decision. Rather than revisiting Sony, the Court
distinguishes Sony from Grokster.2 7 The Court explains that, in Sony,
"[t]here was no evidence that Sony had expressed an object of bringing
about taping in violation of copyright or had taken active steps to increase
its profits from unlawful taping. ' 278  Therefore, in Sony, "the only
conceivable basis for imposing liability was on a theory on contributory
infringement arising from its sale of VCRs to consumers with knowledge
that some would use them to infringe." 279 However, the Sony Court created
an exception "because the VCR was 'capable of commercially significant
noninfringing uses"' to ensure that "the manufacturer could not be faulted
solely on the basis of its distribution.
280
By distinguishing Sony, the Court avoids answering the most disputed
issue before it: What level of infringing use qualifies as "substantial"? The
Court refuses to determine whether the alleged ten-percent noninfringing
use is substantial. 281 More significantly, the Court refuses to hold-as
MGM had urged them to-that a product used "principally" for
infringement does not qualify for protection under Sony.282 The Court
explicitly leaves these questions for another day.283
Then, the Court determines that the Ninth Circuit misapplied Sony.
The Ninth Circuit had interpreted Sony's protection as applying "whenever
a product is capable of substantial lawful use.., unless the distributors had
'specific knowledge of infringement at a time at which they contributed to
the infringement, and failed to act upon that information.' 284 The Court
clarifies that Sony was about imputing defendant's intent to infringe from
the characteristics or uses of a distributed product.285 Sony was not meant
to be applied so broadly as to immunize defendants "when an actual
275. Id. at 2776.
276. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
277. SAME (etc., etc ... ) Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., 125 S. Ct. at 2778.
278. Id. at 2777.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. See id. at 2778.
282. Id.
283. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., 125 S. Ct. at 2778-79 ("It is enough to note that
the Ninth Circuit's judgment rested on an erroneous understanding of Sony and to leave further
consideration of the Sony rule for a day when that may be required.").
284. Id. at 2778.
285. Id.
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purpose to cause infringing use is shown by evidence independent of design
and distribution of the product. '286 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit erred in
concluding that defendants could not be held liable.287
Holding that Sony does not dispose of the case at hand, the Court
articulates the Grokster "inducement" standard for secondary liability.288
First, to render its holding consistent with Sony and common law
precedent, the Court emphasizes that "Sony did not displace other theories
of secondary liability" and that "nothing in Sony requires courts to ignore
evidence of intent if there is such evidence, and the case was never meant
to foreclose rules of fault-based liability derived from the common law.
289
Then, after laying a foundation in precedent, the Court sets forth the
Grokster "inducement" standard:
[O]ne who distributes a device with the object of promoting its
use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other
affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the
resulting acts of inducement by third parties .... [M]ere
knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing uses
would not be enough here to subject a distributor here to
liability. Nor would ordinary acts incident to the product
distribution, such as offering customers technical support or
product updates, support liability in and of themselves.29 °
The Grokster "inducement" test leaves Sony fully intact. Therefore, a
defendant who is not found to have induced infringement under Grokster
may still be found liable under Sony. In other words, absent "clear
expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, ' '291 a
defendant will not be liable under Grokster. However, if there is no
commercially significant use of the product, intent to cause infringement
may be imputed, rendering defendant liable for contributory copyright
infringement under Sony.
2. The Concurring Opinions: Saving Betamax? 
292
Although the unanimous majority of the Court avoids clarifying or
286. Id. (emphasis added).
287. Id. at 2778-79.
288. Id. at 2779.
289. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., 125 S. Ct. at 2778-79.
290. Id. at 2780 (emphasis added).
291. Id.
292. Betamax refers to the Sony case, where the potentially infringing technology was the
Betamax video tape recorders. Sony Corp. ofAmerica, 464 U.S. at 422.
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quantifying Sony's "substantial noninfringing use" test, Justices Ginsburg
and Breyer each wrote separate concurring opinions debating Sony's future.
Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy.293 Justice Breyer's concurring opinion
was joined by Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor.294 Read together,
these two concurrences reveal that the Justices are deeply divided over the
future of Sony. Indeed, given the fact that the unanimous majority declined
to revisit Sony, future cases regarding contributory infringement which do
not clearly involve inducement are likely to turn on the Justices' conflicting
interpretations of Sony set forth in these concurring opinions.
a. Ginsburg's Concurrence: Overwhelming Proportion and Future Uses
Rehnquist, Kennedy, and Ginsburg would deny defendants' motion
for summary judgment under Sony. Their concurrence begins by stating
that "[t]here is here at least a 'genuine issue of material fact, on the liability
of Grokster or StreamCast, not only for actively inducing copyright
infringement, but also or alternatively based on the distribution of their
software products, for contributory copyright infringement., 295 In short,
defendants could be liable under Sony, regardless of Grokster's newly
established inducement test.
Ginsburg notes that the Sony Court "homed in on one potential use-
private, non-commercial time-shifting of television programs in the home"
and determined that time-shifting was noninfringing, because "in some
cases trial testimony showed it was authorized by the copyright
holder,.., and in others it qualified as legitimate fair use. 29 6 Because this
noninfringing use was clearly established, there was "no need in Sony to
'give precise content to the question of how much [actual or potential] use
is commercially significant.'" 297 However, because Grokster's evidence of
noninfringing use was much less persuasive than that in Sony, the Grokster
case presented the Court with an ideal opportunity to clarify Sony's
"commercially significant use" standard.
Ginsburg compares and distinguishes Sony's and Grokster's treatment
298 blnof noninfringing use. She bluntly states, "This case differs markedlyfrom Sony. Here there has been no finding of fair use and little beyond
293. Id. at 2783.
294. Id. at 2787.
295. Id. at 2783.
296. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., 125 S. Ct. at 2784.
297. Id. at 2784 (quoting Sony Corp. ofAmerica, 464 U.S. at 442).
298. Id. at 2785.
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anecdotal evidence of noninfringing uses., 2 99 After summarizing all of the
evidence that defendants presented to the District Court to prove
noninfringing use, Ginsburg concludes that summary judgment in favor of
defendants was not proper.300 Unlike the District Court and the Court of
Appeals, Ginsburg believes that plaintiffs raised a material issue of fact
about whether the level of noninfringing use was "substantial. 30'
Ginsburg indicates that courts should look at the proportion of
noninfringing use relative to the infringing use, instead of merely looking
at evidence offered by defendants.30 2 Ginsburg repeatedly emphasizes that
the "overwhelming" use of defendants' software was infringing and
encouraged the District Court to deny summary judgment in favor of
defendants. 30 3  As such, Ginsburg's Sony standard can be seen as a
balancing test, where summary judgment is only warranted when the scales
tip "overwhelmingly" to one side or the other.
Perhaps most striking, Ginsburg adopts what appears to be a forward-
looking approach to determining substantial noninfringing use under Sony.
In her conclusion, Ginsburg states, "Fairly appraised, the evidence was
insufficient to demonstrate, beyond genuine debate, a reasonable prospect
that substantial or commercially significant uses were likely to develop over
time., 30 4  Therefore, defendants should present evidence of potential
noninfringing uses of their products, even when these noninfringing uses
have not fully materialized in the marketplace. Of course, it is doubtful
that evidence of potential future noninfringing uses, absent actual
noninfringing uses, would be sufficient to meet Ginsburg's Sony standard,
but such evidence could tip the balance in favor of a defendant. In short,
by lifting an eye to future uses, Ginsberg's interpretation of Sony is more
innovation friendly than it first suggests.
b. Breyer Concurrence: Save Betamax
Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Breyer agree with the majority's
decision not to revisit Sony.305 However, they directly rebut the Ginsburg
concurrence by arguing that granting summary judgment under Sony is
299. Id. (citations omitted).
300. Id. at 2786.
301. Id. at 2786 n.4.
302. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., 125 S. Ct. at 2786 ("Even if the absolute number
of noninfringing files copied using [defendants'] software is large, it does not follow that the
products are therefore put to substantial noninfringing uses and are thus immune from liability.").
303. Id.
304. Id. (emphasis added).
305. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., 125 S. Ct. at 2787.
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proper.3°6 Essentially, Breyer argues that the evidence of noninfringing use
in Grokster is analogous to that in Sony. Breyer reminds the Court that, in
Sony, the "magnitude of authorized programming was 'significant"' and
that the Sony Court noted "significant potential for future authorized
copying. 30 7  This was based on references to television programs
authorized for copying, educational programming, religious programming,
and other public broadcasting programs.30 8 Breyer argues that the District
Court appropriately granted summary judgment because the evidence of
noninfringing use offered by defendants in Grokster is roughly
approximate to that offered in Sony.309
Breyer is very concerned about chilling legitimate technological
innovation. For example, he focuses on Sony's use of the word "capable"
in asking whether a product is "capable of substantial noninfringing
uses."3 10 To Stevens, O'Connor, and Breyer, this implies that "a figure like
10%, if fixed for all time, might well prove insufficient, but that such a
figure serves as an adequate foundation where there is a reasonable
prospect of expanded legitimate uses over time.' '311  Breyer states that
defendants' evidence "reveals a significant future market for noninfringing
uses of Grokster-type peer-to-peer software" and that "it seems a likely
inference that lawful peer-to-peer sharing will become increasingly
prevalent. 31 2  Based on current noninfringing uses, which are likely to
continue to grow, and "other now-unforeseen noninfringing uses," Breyer
concludes that defendants satisfy Sony's standard.313
Moving beyond the facts of Grokster, Breyer provides three
arguments to save the Sony-Betamax standard.314 First, he argues that
Sony has worked to protect new technology by "provid[ing] entrepreneurs
with needed assurance that they will be shielded from copyright liability as
they bring valuable new technologies to market., 31 5 In short, Breyer would
preserve Sony's rule because it is "clear, 3 16 "strongly technology
protecting,''317 "forward looking,"3 8 and "mindful of the limitations facing
306. Id.
307. Id. at 2788.
308. Id. (citing Sony Corp. ofAmerica, 464 U.S. at 444-45).
309. Id. at 2788-89.
310. Id. at 2788.
311. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., 125 S. Ct. at 2789 (emphasis added).
312. Id.
313. Id. at 2790 (emphasis added).
314. Id. at 2791-95.
315. Id. at 2791.
316. Id.
317. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., 125 S. Ct. at 2792.
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judges where matters of technology are concerned.,
319
Second, Breyer fears that a modification of Sony's rule would
significantly weaken the law's ability to protect new technology.3 20 Unlike
Ginsburg, Breyer addresses the practical implications of a potential
modification of Sony. For instance, he states "[t]o require defendants to
provide, for example, detailed evidence-say business plans, profitability
estimates, projected technological modifications, and so forth-
would ... increase the legal uncertainty that surrounds the development of
a new technology capable of being put to infringing uses.,, 3 2 1 Innovators
would be "left guessing" about how a court might decide whether its
noninfringing uses were sufficient to avoid liability.
322
Third, Breyer argues that the positive copyright impact of modifying
323Sony would not clearly outweigh technology-related losses. Breyer does
not dispute the importance of protecting copyright.324 Rather, he asserts
that there is simply not a good enough reason to change "the current rules
of the game. 325 Moreover, Breyer refers to many of the same studies cited
herein and concludes that it is simply is not clear that leaving Sony as is
would "lead to a significant diminution in the amount or quality of creative
work produced.,
326
Finally, and most importantly, Breyer recognizes the role that new
technology plays in the solution to this copyright dilemma. For instance,
he notes that "copyright holders may develop new technological devices
that will help curb unlawful infringement. 3 27 Breyer goes on to discuss
digital watermarking, digital fingerprinting, and other encryption
technologies. 328 As this article repeatedly stresses, these new technologies
provide content owners the ability to control their copyrighted content after
initial distribution.329  Breyer also recognizes that the legal market for
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 2792-93.
322. Id. at 2793.
323. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., 125 S Ct. at 2793.
324. Id. "The Constitution itself stresses the vital role that copyright plays in advancing the
useful Arts.' Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. No one disputes that 'reward to the author or artist serves to
induce release to the public of the products of his creative genius."' Id. (citing United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)).
325. Id. at 2793.
326. Id. at 2794.
327. Id. at 2795.
328. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., 125 S. Ct. at 2795.
329. Id.
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digital music has grown rapidly and provides consumers an attractive
alternative to P2P networks.33 ° Indeed, Breyer notes that "lawful music
downloading services... have continued to grow and to produce
substantial revenue." 331 In light of all these reasons, Stevens, O'Connor,
and Breyer see no reason to revisit Sony.332
B. The Inducement Standard: Workable Balance or Legal Quagmire?
Although the Supreme Court may have solved the problem before it,
the Grokster decision raises more questions than it answers. Thankfully,
the Court articulated certain conduct that would not give rise to liability.333
For instance, neither "mere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual
infringing uses" nor "ordinary acts incident to the product distribution,
such as offering customers technical support or product updates" is
sufficient to support liability under Grokster.3 34 Additionally, footnote
twelve reinforces Sony's rule by stating that "in the absence of other
evidence of intent, a court would be unable to find contributory
infringement liability merely based on a failure to take affirmative steps to
prevent infringement, if the device otherwise was capable of substantial
noninfringing uses.
335
These safe-harbors appear to provide considerable protection for
emerging technologies. Nevertheless, content owners and innovators will
debate how to interpret and apply Grokster for years to come. As a
practical matter, the Grokster inducement standard raises four important
issues.
1. Impact On Dual-use Products
Until Grokster, products capable of being used for both legal and
illegal uses, dual-use products, received considerable protection under
Sony, which forbid imputing intent to cause infringement from the
distribution and use of a product. 336 Now, the Supreme Court has turned
the focus from distribution and use of a product to the conduct of the
330. Id. (noting that the affordability lawful copying alternatives has caused consumers to
"migrat[e] to lawful paid services (services with copying permission) where they can enjoy at
little cost even greater convenience and flexibility without engaging in unlawful swapping.").
331. Id.
332. Id. at 2796.
333. Id. at 2780.
334. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., 125 S. Ct. at 2780.
335. Id. at 2781 n.12.
336. ld. at 2778.
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innovator or entrepreneur. 337 Accordingly, innovators and entrepreneurs
who are developing emerging media and communications technologies
must watch their step now.' Rather than spending their hard-earned venture
capital on research and development, entrepreneurs will be asking their
attorneys what "clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster
infringement" 338 really means. Even worse, entrepreneurs who fail to get
good advice face an increased threat of litigation brought by copyright
holders. As a precaution, entrepreneurs and innovators should seek legal
counsel early and often and include counsel in product development and
marketing discussions.
2. Impact On Communications, Advertising, and Customer Service
The Supreme Court repeatedly stresses how Grokster and StreamCast
represented themselves in the marketplace. Specifically, the Court cites to
internal documents evidencing defendants' intent to capture the Napster
user base.339 Additionally, the Court cites to a kit developed by StreamCast
for delivery to advertisers and to promotional materials used to market its
materials as the best Napster altemative.340 Astonishingly, the Court cites
to promotional ideas that were never even used, stating that "StreamCast
even planned to flaunt the illegal uses of its software., 34 1 The Court goes
out of its way to explain that "even if these advertisements were not
released to the public and do not show encouragement to infringe, they
illuminate StreamCast's purposes. 342 Unfortunately, it appears that this is
precisely the type of "other evidence of intent" that may lead to liability
under Grokster.343 Therefore, entrepreneurs and advertisers must be very
careful about what they put in writing. It would be wise to hold advertising
meetings in person and to counsel support staff not to provide advice that
may be related to a customer's infringing use of a product.
3. Impact On Entreprenuer's Choice of Business Model
The Supreme Court demonstrates business model bias in Grokster.
337. Id. at 2780.
338. Id.
339. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., 125 S. Ct. at 2773.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 2773 n.7.
343. See id. at 2782 ("Whether the messages were communicated is not to the point on this
record. The function of the message in the theory of inducement is to prove by a defendant's own
statements that his unlawful purpose disqualifies him from claiming protection.").
CONTROL CONTENT, NOT INNOVATION
Significantly, the Court notes that "the business models employed by
Grokster and StreamCast confirm that their principle object was use of their
software to download copyrighted works." 3" Interestingly, to support this
premise, the Court states that the defendants "generate income by selling
advertising space" and "receive no revenue from users., 345 However, the
Court does not connect the dots. Instead, it merely states, "As the number
of users of each program increases, advertising opportunities become worth
more" and that "substantive volume is a function of free access to
copyrighted work., 346 Later, the Court attempts to clarify this ambiguity
by stating that "the commercial sense of their enterprise turns on high-
volume use, which the record shows is infringing."347 Essentially, the
Court is saying that defendants are culpable because they rely on
advertising for revenue and make more money the more users they have.
However, a subscription-based business model premised on
unauthorized access to copyrighted work would also, presumably, seek to
maximize its number of users so as to maximize revenue. The central issue
is unauthorized access to copyrighted work, not how a company chooses to
profit from that unauthorized access. The Court confuses its concern with
businesses based on infringement with a business' choice of revenue
model. In doing so, the Court reveals its business model bias and casts a
shadow over advertising-based businesses. The practical result is that
having a business model based on advertising may render a defendant
liable under Grokster since its choice of business model apparently
indicates its purpose to induce infringement. Unfortunately for consumers,
this may be the death knell of free content services.
4. Impact On a Company That Becomes Aware Its Product Is Being Used
for Infringement
Perhaps most importantly, Grokster raises the question of how a
company should react to information that its product is being used to
facilitate infringement. The Supreme Court states that "there is no
evidence that either company made an effort to filter copyrighted material
from users' downloads or otherwise impedes the sharing of copyrighted
files. 348 The Court also notes that "StreamCast not only rejected another
company's offer to help monitor infringement,. . . but blocked the Internet
344. Id. at 2774.
345. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., 125 S. Ct. at 2767.
346. Id. at 2781 n.12.
347. Id. at 2782.
348. Id. at 2774.
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Protocol addresses of entities it believed were trying to engage in such
monitoring on its networks., 349 Accordingly, the Supreme Court states that
"this evidence of unlawful objective. . underscores [defendants']
intentional facilitation of their users' infringement. 350  Therefore, P2P
operators who become aware of infringement occurring by means of their
product should take steps to limit that infringement. Specifically,
businesses should pursue Digital Rights Management ("DRM") solutions
and other encryption-based systems that allow them to control content and
reduce infringement.
C. On Remand: District Court Should Set the Inducement Bar High
The Supreme Court makes it abundantly clear that defendants have an
uphill battle to survive summary judgment on remand in the Central
District.351  However, MGM must present compelling evidence that
defendants "communicated an inducing message to their software users. 352
The District Court will examine StreamCast advertisements "beamed" to its
users urging them to adopt its P2P software and Grokster's electronic
newsletter touting the ability of its software to provide access to
copyrighted material. Additionally, the District Court will examine
responses by customer service personnel helping users to locate
copyrighted materials. 53
It is critical that the District Court clearly and narrowly apply the new
Grokster standard. Applying Grokster broadly would introduce even more
ambiguity and costs to innovators and entrepreneurs. Specifically, "clear
expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement" should
not be found in anecdotal evidence of product development ideas,
advertising strategies, and customer support records. Rather, the District
Court should only find inducement if the evidence taken as a whole shows
that defendants consistently and systematically undertook to foster
infringement. Indeed, the evidence may well show this was the case with
Grokster and StreamCast. However, by setting the bar high, the District
Court will ease the chilling effects of the Supreme Court's Grokster
decision on innovators and entrepreneurs while still accomplishing its
primary objective-stamping out businesses intentionally based on
infringement.
349. Id. (citations omitted).
350. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., 125 S. Ct. at 2781.
351. Id. at 2782.
352. Id. at 2780.
353. Id. at 2781.
CONTROL CONTENT, NOTINNOVATION
D. Conclusion. Hollywood, Meet Silicone Valley
Although the Justices express concern for potential chilling effects on
technological innovation, they have handed copyright holders a powerful
tool in Grokster. It remains to be seen what the true effects of the decision
will be. Of course, the effects on current innovators will be more
immediate and noticeable. However, the gravest threat is to future
innovators. If Grokster is applied broadly or inconsistently, innovators and
their investors may determine, as a purely financial matter, that they simply
could not sustain the potential legal costs and, consequently, determine to
never enter the market at all.
Most importantly, content owners should turn to the market and not
the courts if they want to increase profits and meet their customers' needs.
The long-term success of the music industry is dependent on Hollywood's
ability to adapt to new technologies and distribution models and not their
ability to win copyright infringement lawsuits. Indeed, after the Supreme
Court issued its decision in Grokster, Hillary Rosen, the former head of the
Recording Industry Association of America, stated that "[k]nowing we
were right legally really still isn't the same thing as being right in the real
world. 354 Perhaps the tide is turning after all.
Hollywood, meet Silicone Valley.
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